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INTRODUCTION

In 1983, Congress radically altered' Medicare reimbursement for hospital
services.2 It replaced the preexisting system that paid hospitals the actual costs
of treating Medicare patients with a "prospective payment system" (PPS) that
pays hospitals a fixed amount for each patient.3 Congress took this action due
to the excessive inflation caused by the former system of cost-based reimbursement, which paid more to inefficient hospitals offering excessive treatment than
to efficient, cost conscious hospitals.'
This bold revision of Medicare appears promising based on first-year results,5
but there are storm clouds building in two directions on the horizon. On the
substantive front, critics attack PPS's incentive for hospitals to offer poor quality

1. One author explained this change thus: "Not only did it represent a radical change in
the way hospitals would be paid under the Medicare program, but it involved the federal government, for the first time, in the setting of specific rates or prices for hospital services." Verville,
Medicare Rate Selting and Its Problems, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 85, 88 (1985).
2. The Medicare program provides health care insurance for the aged, blind, and disabled,
and for patients suffering from end-stage renal disease. 42 U.S.C. S 1395c (1982). Medicare is
divided into two parts. Part A reimburses institutional providers of health care services - hospitals,
nursing homes, home health agencies, and hospices. Id. SS 1395d-1395i (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
Part B covers other health care services such as physician treatment, outpatient care, medicine,
and supplies. Id. SS 1395j-1395w. This article concerns only Part A hospital services.
3. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65. While the prospective payment system was being studied, Congress, as part of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), enacted a one-year transitional payment scheme that modified
cost reimbursement by imposing certain limits on hospital operating costs and by giving hospitals
financial incentives to meet certain "target amounts." TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 1982 U.S.
CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws (96 Stat) 324; see infra text accompanying note 88 (describing "TEFRA
target amount" system).
4.

See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,

HOSPITAL PROSPECTIVE

PAYMENT FOR

MEDICARE: REPORT TO CONGRESS REQUIRED BY THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT
OF

1982 (DEC. 1982), reprinted in

MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE

(CCH), Extra Edition No. 374

(Jan. 5, 1983) [hereinafter cited as REPORT TO CONGRESS].

The body of literature discussing the cost-saving features of PPS crosses many disciplines.
The four major articles in the legal literature are: Phillips, Wineberg & Elfenbein, Meeting the Goals
of Medicare Prospective Payments, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 225 (1986); Phillips & Wineberg, Medicare
Prospective Payment: A Quiet Revolution, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 13 (1984); Note, Rethinking Medical
Malpractice Law in Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1004 (1985); and Note, Medicare's
Prospective Payment Systens Can Quality Care Survive?, 69 IowA L. REV. 1417 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Quality Care].
5. See Health Care Costs: The Fever Breaks, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 21, 1.985, at 86. During 1984,
spending for health care increased only 9%, the first non-double-digit increase in 20 years. Simultaneously, the price of hospitalization dropped slightly for the first time in more than a decade.
Hospital lengths of stay declined 4%, occupancy rates dropped 6%, and admissions fell 3%.
Meanwhile, the hospital industry experienced one of its most profitable years ever. AMERICAN Hosp.
ASs'N, 1984 HOSPITAL STATisrICS xvii (1985); Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1985, at 6, col. 1; see also
Medicare's Prospective Payment System: Hearings Before the Task Force on Health of the House Committee on
the Budget, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 21-23, 49, 219-23 (1985) (statements of Rep. Henry A. Waxman;
Director of Congressional Budget Office Rudolf G. Penner; Acting Administrator of Health Care
Financing Administration C. McClain Haddow; and American Hospital Association) [hereinafter
cited as PPS Hearings]. These trends continued into 1985. Ste HOSPITALS, Dec. 16, 1985, at 36; see
also Phillips, Wineberg & Elfenbein, supra note 4, at 227-30.
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care. 6 On the procedural front, a controversy is raging over the proper appeal

mechanism for challenging payment rates under the new system. All the initial
cases decided under PPS have concerned the proper procedures for hospital
rate appeals. 7 Commentators, however, have focused mainly on the substantive
debate. 8 Consequently, there is a need for careful examination of the procedural

issues raised by Medicare's new payment system.
PPS pays hospitals a fixed amount for each patient treated, based on a
product of two factors: an average rate per discharge and a weighting factor

for the individual patient. The average rate per discharge is a standardized
amount for each hospital predetermined at the beginning of each PPS year.

The individual weighting factor is established upon each patient's discharge by
assigning the patient to one of 470 "diagnosis related groups" (DRGs) based
on the patient's age, illness, and condition. 9 To illustrate, DRG number 89
designates patients with simple pneumonia and who are older than 69 or have

a complicating condition. It has a weighting factor of 1.1768.10 Thus, if the
standardized rate per discharge is $2500, a hospital will be paid $2942 for a
patient assigned to this DRG.
6. The leading critic is Senator John Heinz (R-Pa.), Chairman of the Senate Special Committee on Aging; that committee is conducting hearings on PPS's effects on quality of care. See
HOSPITALS, Nov. 1, 1985, at 24. For other critics of PPS, see Dolenc & Dougherty, DRGs: The
Counterrevolution in Financing Health Care, 15 HAsTINGS CErrER REPORT No. 3, at 19 (June 1985);
Enthoven & Noll, Prospective Payment: Will it Solve Medicare's Financial Problem?, 1 IssuEs Sci. & TECH.
101 (1984); Verville, supra note 1; Wagner, DRGs and Other Payment Groupings: The Impact on Medical
Practice and Technology, in THE HEALTH POLICY 85 (M.

Levin ed. 1985); Note, Quality Care, supra

note 4.

7.

See St. Francis Hosp. v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1986); Washington Hosp. Center

v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Charter Medical Corp. v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 728 (11th

Cir. 1986); Good Samaritan Medical Center v. Secretary, 776 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1985); Greenville
Hosp. Sys. v. Bowen, 4 MEDICARE & MEICAID GUIDE (CCH)
35,880 337-3 (D.S.C. Sept. 16,
1986); Episcopal Hosp. v. Bowen, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 35,852 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25,
1986); Southeastern Palm Beach County Hosp. Dist. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE
(CCH)
35,047 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 1985); Medical Center Hosp. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE &
MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 34,920 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 1985); Samaritan Health Center v. Heckler,
636 F. Supp. 503 (D.C.D.C. 1985); Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID
GuIDE (CCH)
34,832 (D.S.C. July 19, 1985); Doctors Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Heckler, 613 F.
Supp. 1036 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Sunshine Health Sys. Inc. v. Heckler, No. CV-85-953 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 10, 1985); Charter Medical Corp. v. Heckler, No. C-84-116A (N.D. Ga. Mar. 20, 1985);
Healthcare Int'l, Inc. v. Memphis Hosp. Serv. & Surgical Ass'n, [1984-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
34,214 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 27, 1984); Redbud Hosp. Dist. v.
Heckler, [1984-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
34,085 (N.D. Cal. July
30, 1984), applicationfor stay of injunction granted in part and denied in part, 106 S. Ct. 1 (1985). Several
of these cases are discussed briefly in Clinton, Provider Appeals Route Evolving Under the Medicare
Prospective Payment System, HEALTH LAW VICIL, Nov. 29, 1985, at 19. See generally Thalliner, Prospective
Payment System: Preclusion of Review of Hospital Base Year Cost Calculations, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 509 (1985).
8. See supra notes 4 & 6.
9. 42 C.F.R. SS 412.2(a), 412.60, 412.62 (1985); see Charter Medical Corp. v. Bowen, 788
F.2d 728, 731 (11th Cir. 1986); Verville, supra note 1, at 91; Note, Quality Care, supra note 4, at
1420, 1422-24. This DRG categorization system groups illnesses according to average resource
consumption; it distinguishes among patients according to primary diagnosis, age, and condition.
Each DRG weighting factor is determined by that category's average resource consumption relative
to the average for all hospital patients. 42 C.F.R. S 412.60 (1985).
10. 50 Fed. Reg. 35,646, at 35,724 (1985).
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The calculation of the rate per discharge or "PPS rate" is important to
the proper functioning of the new system for several reasons. First, and most
obvious, the higher the PPS rate, the more money hospitals will receive from
Medicare. Second, the PPS rate is the only payment determinant hospitals may
appeal to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (Review Board)." The
DRG classification scheme and its weighting factors are not reviewable.1' Third,
the PPS rate may affect private reimbursement as well as Medicare payments
because some Blue Cross plans are experimenting with reimbursement under
a DRG system.' 3 If private DRG plans follow the Medicare PPS rate when
determining their payment rates, then a Medicare rate appeal could have a
collateral effect on private sources of hospital revenue. Finally, PPS rates are
important to Medicare patients and to society at large. The new payment system
does not rely on market forces to generate payment rates; it still requires administered prices.' 4 Thus, the process of setting PPS rates maintains the critical
balance between quality and cost in health care15 for Medicare patients.
For these reasons, the most critical procedural question under the new payment system is how to appeal PPS rates.6 This article addresses whether the
government has accurately structured the appeal mechanism hospitals must use
to obtain administrative and judicial review of payment rates. In fashioning
this appeal structure, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)'7 has
enacted two controversial restrictions: a rule denying retroactive correction of
erroneous PPS rates, and a rule requiring hospitals to wait long after the end
of their fiscal years before appealing their PPS rates. An examination of these
restrictions will demonstrate they are unreasonable and inconsistent with the
basic theory underlying the new payment system.
This inquiry is important for several reasons. First, on a practical level, the
procedural aspects of PPS are essential to its proper functioning and its ultimate

11. There are two appeal structures under Medicare Part A. One is primarily for beneficiaries
(patients), and resolves payment disputes for individual patients. 42 U.S.C. S 1395ff(b) (Supp. Ill
1985). The other is exclusively for providers (hospitals), and determines the accuracy of intermediaries' determinations of the total amount of reimbursement for the year. Id. S 1395oo (1982
& Supp. III 1985). This article concerns only the latter appeal structure. Under it, the Provider
Reimbursement Review Board has jurisdiction over provider disputes with an amount in controversy
of $10,000 or more. Id. The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (through
his delegate, the Health Care Financing Administration) may sua sponte review the Board's decisions.
Id. S 1395oo(). Federal courts, beginning with the district court, have jurisdiction over provider
appeals from either Review Board or Secretary (HCFA) decisions. Id.
12. Id. 55 1395oo(g), 1395ww(d)(7).
13. Conversation with Peter Smist, Manager of Actuarial Research at Blue Cross/Blue Shield
of Arizona (Jan. 30, 1986); Conversation with Robert Snyder, Executive Director of Payment
Management for the Blue Cross/Blue Shield Association (Apr. 18, 1986). See Alpert & McCarthy,
Beyond Goldfarb: Applying TraditionalAntitrust Analysis to Changing Health Markets, 29 ANTITRUST BULL.
165, 172 (1984) ("published DRG rates provide a reimbursement model . . . to other insurers").
14. Enthoven & Noll, supra note 6, at 101, 104.
15. See Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The Role
of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. Rev. 6 (1975).

16. The appeal procedures governing individual payment disputes and the DRG classification
system are also important, but consideration of these procedures must await a future article.
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success. Of more theoretical interest is the relationship of the appeal procedures
to the essence of the new system, its "prospectivity." This article analyzes how
the concept of prospectivity functions under the new payment system and whether
the government has been faithful to this concept in fashioning rate appeal procedures. Thus, behind the procedural surface of rate appeals looms a critical
substantive concern that goes to the very heart of PPS's operation.
A brief overview of the coverage of Medicare's prospective payment system
will be useful in understanding subsequent portions of this analysis. At least
initially, PPS incorporates only hospital operating costs; capital costs are not
included. Capital costs are still reimbursed according to actual expenditures."
PPS also excludes the expenses of medical education incurred by teaching hospitals; these too are reimbursed under the old cost-based system.' 9 Likewise,
PPS applies only to short-term general hospitals; long-term, psychiatric, and
rehabilitation hospitals, or parts of general hospitals falling within these categories, are excluded.2 "
It is also necessary to understand the nature of the predetermined rate per
discharge, which is the focus of this article. This rate is referred to as the
"prospective payment rate" (or the "PPS rate"). Once PPS is fully operational,
a single, standardized "national rate" will be established based on the historical
average cost per discharge for hospitals throughout the country. The national
PPS rate will be the same for each hospital, except that an adjustment will be
made according to hospitals' classifications as urban or rural. 2' The rate will
also be adjusted by a "wage index" to account for differing hospital wages
among various regions of the country.22
PPS is not fully operational at the outset; a four-year transition period is
scheduled from 1984 through 1987 (fiscal years).2 ' During this transition period
each hospital's PPS rate is a blend of a "hospital-specific rate," that is, a rate
derived from that hospital's historical average cost per discharge, and a standardized rate. The standardized rate is a blend of the national rate and a rate
based on an average cost per discharge for hospitals in each of several regions
17. By statute, the administration of Medicare is assigned to the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services (Secretary), who in turn has delegated rulemaking and administrative
functions to HOFA. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395kk (1982); 2 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GuIDE (GCH)

13,160, 13,170 (1982-1983).
18. 42 U.S.C. S 1395ww(a)(4) (Supp. III 1985).
19. 42 C.F.R. S 412.2(d) (1985). A third source of extra payments are cases called "outliers,"
in which the costs far exceed the norm for the applicable DRG. Outlier cases receive extra payments
to help offset their extraordinary costs. 42 U.S.C. S 1395ww(d)(SXAXii) (Supp. III 1985).
20. 42 U.S.C. S 1395ww(dXl)(A) (Supp. III 1985); 42 C.F.R. S 412.23 (1985).
21. In addition to the urban/rural qualification noted in the text, a hospital's rate may differ
from the national rate if it is the only hospital in the community, a rural referral center, one that
treats a disproportionate share of low income or elderly patients, a teaching hospital, one located
in Alaska or Hawaii, or a hospital subject to other unique circumstances. 42 U.S.C. S 1395ww(dX5XB)"
(C) (Supp. III 1985).
22. 42 C.F.R. S 412.63 (1985).
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 5 9102,
CODE CoNe. & AD. NEws (100 Stat.) 82, 155 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. S
1395ww(dX I)(A)).
23.

1986 U.S.
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of the country.24 This standardized portion of the PPS trinsition period rate
will be referred to as the "national/regional rate," as distinguished from the
hospital-specific rate. This article presents a detailed explanation of the inadequacies of the system designed by HCFA for correcting errors that occur in
setting these various rates.
II.

RETROACTIVE RELIEF WITHIN A PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM

One month before PPS became effective, HCFA announced a policy of
refusing to correct retroactively a hospital's transition period rate if an error
was made in measuring hospital costs on which the rate is based. Instead,
HCFA limits the relief to prospective correction of transition period rates. " This
is referred to as HCFA's "prospective relief rule. ''26 Although this rule applies
only to the hospital-specific portion of the transition period rate,2 7 its validity
could be important beyond the transition period. HCFA might adopt the same
rule with respect to corrections of the national PPS rate.2 8 This analysis is also
important because an examination of the prospective relief rule reqaires a precise
understanding of how the concept of prospectivity functions within the new
payment system. First, however, the mechanics of the prospective relief rule
must be understood.
A.

Operation and Effect of the Prospective Relief Rule

During the four-year transition period, each hospital's PPS rate is composed
of an objective and subjective portion. The objective portion is the national/

24.

42 U.S.C. S 1395ww(d)(IXA) (Supp. III 1985); 42 C.F.R. S 412.70 (1985). There appears

to be an important inconsistency between the statutory methodology for computing transition period
payments and the methodology enacted by HOFA. Under one reading of the statute, the hospitalspecific portion of the amount paid for each patient is based on the TEFRA target amount, that
is, the adjusted average cost per discharge historically experienced by that hospital without any
consideration of the patient's diagnosis. HCFA, however, views this target amount as part of the
PPS rate. As such, it would be weighted according to each patient's DRG classification. This issue
is outside the scope of this article, and I will assume that HCFA is correct.
25. 48 Fed. Reg. 39,752, at 39,772, 39,825 (1983) (codified as revised at 42 C.F.R. $
412.72(a)(3)(ii) (1985)).

26. Hospitals prefer the title "anti-correction rule," because it avoids what they perceive as
a positive connotation in prospective relief. See Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Bowen, 4 MEDICARE &
35,880, at 12,428 n.3 (D.S.C. Sept. 16, 1986).
MEDICAID GuIDE (CCH)
27. The hospital-specific rate constitutes a portion of the blended PPS rate during the fouryear transition period in the amount of 75% the first year, 50% the second, 45% the third, and
25% the fourth. Supra note 23.
28. HCFA has recently expressed its inclination toward refusing retroactive corrections of the
national PPS rate in comments made with reference to the revision of the wage index used to adjust
that rate. Congress recently passed legislation prospectively revising the wage index in order to correct "a number of technical flaws." Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub.
L. 99-272, 5 9103, 1986 U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. NEvs (100 Stat.) 82, 156. HCFA's acting administrator spoke in favor of this provision, explaining: "[W]e believe that applying the [corrected]
wage index retroactively, as required by existing law, would be inconsistent with the PPS premise
that hospitals know in advance of each discharge the amount they can be expected to be paid by
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regional average cost per discharge; the subjective portion is the hospital-specific
rate, a rate based on each hospital's actual average cost per discharge during
a previous "base year. '"29 The base year is a hospital's fiscal year beginning
on or after October 1, 1981,11' two years before each hospital comes under
PPS.'" Because hospitals have varying fiscal years, this base year will be referred
to generically as the 1982 fiscal year.
A hospital's costs during the base year are determined by an audit of the
hospital's cost report for the 1982 fiscal year, conducted by a fiscal intermediary. 2 If the intermediary makes an error in calculating a hospital's complex
base year costs, the hospital is obviously interested in correcting the error because it affects the hospital's reimbursement not only for the 1982 fiscal year,
but also for the four years during the transition period. Because the financial
consequences of such an error can be severe, many base year appeals have
already reached the courts.-"
HCFA has ruled a hospital that appeals the audit and settlement of its 1982
cost report and establishes that a mistake was made will have its hospital-specific
rate corrected only for fiscal years beginning on or after the date of a final
successful appeal decision. " HCFA will not retroactively correct the PPS rate
in effect during previous PPS years or even during the current year.' HCFA

Medicare." PPS Hearings, supra note 5, at 51 (statement of C. McClain Haddow); see also 51 Fed.
Reg. 8208, 8210-11 (1986).
29. 42 U.S.C. S 1395ww(d)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1985); 42 C.F.R. S 412.70 (1985). This hospitalspecific rate is the hospital's "target amount" under TEFRA, with certain modifications necessary
to make the target amount conform to the new payment system. See 42 U.S.C. S 1395ww(d)(1)(A)
(Supp. III 1985); 42 C.F.R. S 412.70 (1985). Thus, the PPS base year is the same as the TEFRA
base year.
30. 42 C.F.R. S 405.463(a)-(b) (1984); 42 C.F.R. S 412.71(a)(1) (1985).
31. A hospital starts on PPS at the first of its fiscal year beginning on or after October 1,
1983. 42 U.S.C. S 1395ww(d)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. III 1985).
32. Fiscal intermediaries are private insurance companies (often Blue Cross/Blue Shield) with
which HCFA contracts to carry out much of the front-line administration of the Medicare program.
42 U.S.C. S 1395h (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 42 C.F.R. S 400.202 (1984).
33. See cases cited supra note 7 (all these cases concern the hospital-specific rate except for
Good Samaritan Medical Center v. Secretary, 776 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1985), and Medical Center
Hosp. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GuIDE (CCH) 34,920 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 1985)).
34. See 42 C.F.R. S5 412.72(a)(3)(i)(D), .72(a)(3)(ii) (1985):
412.72(a)(3)(i)(D) The intermediary may adjust base-period costs to take into account
additional costs recognized as allowable costs for the hospital's base year as the result of
* * * [a]n administrative or judical review decision under SS 405.1831, 405.1871, or 405.1877
of this chapter that is final and no longer subject to review under applicable law or
regulations by a higher reviewing authority, and that resolved a matter at issue in the
hospital's base-year notice of amount of program reimbursement.
.72(a)(3)(ii) The intermediary will recalculate the hospital's base-year costs, incorporating
the additional costs recognized as allowable for the hospital's base year. Adjustments to
base-year costs to take into account these additional costs - (A) Will be effective with
the first day of the hospital's first cost reporting period beginning on or after the date of
the revision, order or finding, or review decision; and (B) Will not be used to recalculate
the hospital specific portion as determined for fiscal years beginning before the date of the
revision, order or finding, or review decision.
35. HCFA has recently offered a reinterpretation of its prospective relief rule. As reported
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has further ruled a successful appeal decision will not be considered final until
it has passed through all levels of judicial review.3 6 A district court reversal of
the intermediary on a disputed base year cost issue, thus, is not effective under
PPS until all appeals are exhausted through two additional levels of federal
courts.
These rules effectively deny most hospitals an opportunity to correct their
hospital-specific rates.37 Consider, for example, St. Francis Hospital in Charles-

by the court in Charter Medical Corp. v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 728, 734-35 (11th Cir. 1986), HCFA
maintains that the bar on retroactive relief is only temporary. Hospitals may not receive retroactive
correction of their hospital-specific rates in an appeal of their 1982 cost reports, but may obtain
such relief in their actual 1984 through 1987 PPS appeals, despite principles of administrative res
judicata that ordinarily would prevent relitigation of base year cost errors. HCFA thus convinced
the Eleventh Circuit that "full relief" is ultimately available to hospitals. 788 F.2d at 735. This
apparent concession is, in -effect, a deceptive expansion of the bar on rate correction. HCFA now
maintains that hospital-specific rates can be corrected only if erroneous at the time they were
estimated by the intermediary. Thus, HCFA effectively bars any correction of certain types of
errors. See infra text accompanying notes 95-101. This reinterpretation is based on the same rationale
as the prospective relief rule;therefore, this article will focus on the prospective relief rule
as written and consider only secondarily the reinterpretation. Whether HCFA will adhere to the
reinterpretation is uncertain. See, e.g., DeKalb Memorial Hasp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Assoc.,
4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
35,400 (HCFA Administrator's decision May 23, 1986)
(declaring that prospective relief rule applies whenever Review Board has jurisdiction over PPS
issues). The reinterpretation has not been expressed clearly in the regulations; indeed, it appears
to be contradicted by 42 C.F.R. S 412.72(a)(4) (1985), which allows retroactive correction of only
"modifications" of base year costs, excluding by implication such correction of the original calculation of costs. See infra text at notes 75-80 for a discussion of this distinction. See also 42 C.F.R.
S 412.72(b)(1) (1985) (incorporating by reference the prospective relief rule into PPS appeals).
36. 42 C.F.R. §5 412.72(a)(3)(i)(D), .72(a)(3)(ii) (1985). The history behind the finality portion of the rule is rather baroque. As first enacted September 1, 1983, the rule referred to prospective
relief after the decision in a "successful appeal relating to base period costs." The rule did not
mention the finality or appealability of the decision. 48 Fed. Reg. 39,752, at 39,825 (1983) (codified
at 42 C.F.R. S 405.474(bXlXivXB) (1985)). On July 3, 1984, HCFA proposed to amend the rule
to include prospective relief for base year appeals settled favorably to the provider, in addition to
appeals made successful by decision. Rather than simply adding settled appeals to the prospective
relief rule, HCFA's proposal redrafted the entire rule, referring to "final administrative or judicial
review decision." 49 Fed. Reg. 27,422, at 27,428 (1984) (codified at 42 C.F.R. S
405.474(b)(3)(l)(cX)(iii) (1985)). The 1984 proposal still did not address the possibility of further
appeal, but when HCFA adopted its proposal concerning settlements, it "clarified" the term "final
administrative or judicial review decision" as "a decision that is no longer subject to review under
applicable law or regulations by a higher reviewing authority." 49 Fed. Reg. 34,728, at 34,73940 (1984). Thus, although the rulemaking set out only to include settled appeals within the prospective relief rule, incidental redrafting introduced a new, stringent concept of finality of the appeal
decision. The finality aspect of the prospective relief rule was invalidated in Charter Medical Corp.
v. Heckler, 604 F. Supp. 638, 640-41 (M.D. Ga. 1985), but that decision was reversed on jurisdictional grounds, 788 F.2d 728 (lth Cir. 1986). This article will not address further the finality
portion of the rule in isolation because of the conclusion that the rule as a whole is invalid.
37. But see Washington Hosp. Center v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 149 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
("the Secretary's interpretation does not - as some district courts have mistakenly held - . . .
bar any review whatsoever"). This assertion is based on HCFA's recent and as yet unsettled
reinterpretation of the prospective relief rule. See supra note 35. Even if the reinterpretation takes
hold, the D.C. Circuit is still incorrect in stating that "the effect of the prospective relief regulation
is [merely] to delay [relief . .. but . . . [the rule does] not completely bar relief for hospitals
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ton, West Virginia, whose base year was calendar year 1982."I It received its
final reimbursement notice" for that year on December 30, 1983.4" It filed an
appeal with the Review Board within a month. 41 Since St. Francis' first PPS
year had already begun (January 1, 1984), it was too late to correct the 1984
rate, no matter how quickly it might have prevailed. By the end of the year,
the intermediary acknowledged an error of approximately $85,000 in its base
year cost calculation. Nevertheless, HCFA corrected St. Francis' hospital-specific
rate for only the last three years of the transition period, 1985, 1986, and
1987.42

This result illustrates the harsh effects of the prospective relief rule when
HCFA capitulates during the appeal. The rule's effects are even more pronounced if a hospital must fully litigate its 1982 cost report before the Review
Board. The Review Board consists of five members, all of whom usually participate in each decision. 41' It has a backlog of approximately 2,600 cases, with
new cases arriving at a rate of a hundred or more a month. 44 Although a
substantial number of cases are resolved without a hearing,4" the hearing case
load is heavy and the time to decision protracted. For the 827 cases reported
during 1982, 1983 and 1984, the average delay in obtaining a final Review
Board decision was 4.3 years. 4", Only .24 percent of the cases were decided
whose hospital-specific rates have been set erroneously." Id. HOFA's new position deceptively bars
such relief even more resolutely. See infra text accompanying notes 95-101.
38. St. Francis Hosp. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GuIDE (CCH)
34,918 (S.D.
W. Va. Sept. 30, 1985), aff'd in part, re'd in part, sub nom. St. Francis Hosp. v. Bowen, 802
F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1986).
39. In Medicare jargon, this notice is referred to as an "NPR" (notice of program reimbursement).
40. Compared to the usual delay, this is a fairly prompt reimbursement notice. See infra note
141.
41. St. Francis Hosp. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 34,918, at 9512,
9517 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 30, 1985).
42. Id. at 9512. If the intermediary's concession had occurred just five days later, the correction would have been made for only 1986 and 1987.
43. 42 C.F.R. 5 405.1845 (1985). Only three members are required for a quorum. Individual
board members may conduct the actual hearing and draft a recommended order. Id.
44. Clinton, supra note 7, at 19.
45. Some cases are settled; some are given an expedited, bypass appeal to the district court;
and some are dismissed for lack of the $10,000 jurisdictional amount or other defects. See 42 U.S.C.
S 1395oo (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
46. The median delay was four years, with 47.9% of the cases taking more than four years
to be decided. This delay period can be calculated from information contained in the Review Board
decisions reported in Medicare & Medicaid Cuid (CCH), except for the small number of decisions
CCH does not report fully because they are entirely duplicative of another recent decision. For
example, in 1982, only eight of 140 decisions were not fully reported. Unreported cases were
disregarded in this study.
The raw data for this study was initially gathered and partially analyzed under the direction
of attorneys Glen A. Reed and Richard L. Shackleford with King & Spalding in Atlanta, Georgia,
counsel in two cases that challenge both the prospective relief rule and the rule discussed in part
III below requiring a settled cost report before bringing a PPS appeal. See Charter Medical Corp.
v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 728 (11th Cir. 1986); Charter Medical Corp. v. Heckler, No. C84-116A (N.D.
Ga. 1986). The idea for this study originated with Mr. Reed. The raw data has been independently
analyzed and double checked for this article.
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within one year of the end of the hospital's fiscal year and only 52.1 percent
4 7
were decided within four years.
Since under the prospective relief rule a base year appeal must be resolved
within one year to affect the first-year PPS rate, only a tiny fraction of hospitals
will be able to resolve their base year cost disputes before the Review Board
in time to have full effect. Moreover, because a base year appeal must be
resolved within four years to affect any PPS transition year rate, approximately
one-half of hospitals will receive no benefit from a Review Board decision. Even
this figure may be low as it assumes that HCFA will not exercise its authority
to reverse Review Board decisions that are favorable to hospitals. 48 If it does,
providers will have to take their appeals to the federal courts, delaying ultimate
relief for several more years49 and making it almost certain that no fully litigated
base year appeal will ever be decided in time to affect a PPS transition year."
47.

The following table sets forth the percentile for each year of delay:
Cases Decided
Within

I year
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Percentage
.24%
3.5
20.5
52.1
75.6
87.8
94.3
98.1
99.3
99.8
100.0

The delay figure is calculated from the end of the cost reporting (fiscal) year to the date the Review
Board decision is issued, rounded to the nearest quarter year. In the few cases not specifying a
year-ending date, March 31 was assumed, as it is six months from October 1, the beginning of
the base year and the PPS fiscal year cycles. Interestingly, 67% of the 1982 decisions resulted in
a reversal or modification of the intermediary's position on at least one issue in the provider's
favor. See supra note 46 (data gathered and analyzed solely by Messrs. Reed and Shackleford).
(This statistic does not include issues settled in the provider's favor by the intermediary prior to
a hearing, such as occurred in St. Francis Hosp. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE
(CCH)
34,918 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 30, 1985)).
48. 42 C.F.R. S 405.1875(a) (1985).
49. Over the past six years, the median time from filing the notice of appeal until disposition
of the case in the courts of appeal has been 10 to 11 months. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, 1985 FED. CT. MOT. STATISTICS 29. Presumably, the elapsed time would be approximately
the same in the district courts because the nature of the review is the same for each administrative
appeal. Assuming the United States Supreme Court denied a request for certiorari, approximately
nine more months would be added - three to file the petition and an average of six months to
act on the petition. Communication with Supreme Court clerk's office staff (Dec. 12, 1985).
50. If the only base year dispute is oer the validity of a regulation, the provider may bypass
the Review Board, which has no authority to invalidate regulations, and appeal directly to the
courts. 42 U.S.C. S 1395oo()(1) (Supp. III 1985). If the courts grant expedited consideration, a
final nonappealable decision might be obtained within one to two years after the 1982 reimbursement
notice is issued. Conceivably, the final decision could be in time to affect the final year or two
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The prospective relief rule also has a perverse effect when considered in
light of the PPS transition schedule. During the transition period, the hospitalspecific rate occupies a decreasing portion of the PPS rate each year: 751%,
50%, 45% and 25%." Yet it is only as these years advance that hospitals gain
any possible chance of correcting the base rate. Thus, hospitals have the least
chance of obtaining relief when a mistake in the base rate is most detrimental.
As one court perceptively observed, "[t]his is contrary to the intent of Congress
that the most 'cushion' in the transition period be provided in the first PPS
year. "'
The rule is particularly harsh when the government refuses to honor a
precedent in a hospital's district or circuit that affects its base year costs, as
the Secretary of Health and Human Services is prone to do." For example,
in Charter Medical Corp. v. Bowen,5 4 a case recently decided by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, a group of hospitals sought to have their hospitalspecific rates corrected because of an erroneous treatment of their malpractice
insurance costs in their base years. The Eleventh Circuit had previously held
in another case that HCFA's position on malpractice insurance premiums was
incorrect," but HCFA refused to correct these hospitals' PPS rates until they
pursued the same issue to finality through their base year appeals.5 6 Thus, the
prospective relief rule allows HCFA to deny hospitals the benefits in their PPS
7
transition years of battles won in prior years. 5
of the PPS transition period. This generously assumes the reimbursement notice is issued one year
after the end of the hospital's 1982 fiscal year. But see infra note 141. Such a case was working
its way through the courts, but was dismissed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on the
grounds that the hospital had not stated the proper jurisdictional basis, nor had it correctly requested
a bypass of the Review Board. Charter Medical v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 728 (11th Cir. 1986).
51. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, S 9102,
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nasvs (100 Stat.) 82, 155 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1395ww(d)(1)(A) (1986)).
52. Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Bowen, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 35,880, at
12,433 (D.S.C. Sept. 16, 1986).

53. See Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26, 28 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (discussing Secretary's
nonacquiescence in Court of Appeals' disability precedents), modified on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1489
(9th Cir.), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 583 (1984); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y.

1985) (invalidating Secretary's nonacquiescence policy).
54. 788 F.2d 728 (11th Cir. 1986).
55.

Lloyd Noland Hosp. & Clinic v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir. 1985). Another

Charter Medical hospital was a party in this case.
56.

Paradoxically, although HCFA conceded to the Eleventh Circuit the invalidity of the

malpractice rule, Charter Medical Corp. v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 728, 728 n.1 (11th Cir. 1986), it continued
to refuse to grant the hospitals the benefit of this concession by correcting the erroneously determined
hospital-specific rates. Thus, although HCFA voiced acquiescence to the court, it in fact practiced
passive nonacquiescence. See Brief for the Appellants, Lloyd & Noland Hosp. & Clinic v. Heckler,
762 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir. 1985).
57. Another striking effect of the rule is illustrated by St. Francis Hosp. v. Bowen, 802 F.2d
697 (4th Cir. 1986), and Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)

34,832 (D.S.C. July 19, 1985). In both these cases, HCFA (or its agent, the fiscal intermediary)
conceded a base year error during a Review Board appeal, but refused to correct past or present

PPS rates affected by the error. St. Francis Hosp., 802 F.2d at 699 n.2; Greemville Hosp. Sys., 4
MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE

at 9172.
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Reasons for the Rule

Such a procrustean rule requires strong justification. HOFA gives three
reasons for the rule: (1) preserving the "prospectivity" of the new payment
system; (2) preserving "budget neutrality"; and (3) avoiding inappropriate find
tuning of an inherently crude transition period payment factor.5 Each of these
justifications is inadequate.
1.
a.

The Prospectivity Rationale
The Meaning of Prospectivity

HCFA's contention that the nature of the prospective payment system allows
only prospective rate correction has some substance. Under PPS, hospitals know
their rates in advance" 9 Retroactive correction of the rates may undermine the
certainty of the system. The statute requires HCFA to publish the national/
regional rate one month in advance of each PPS year,"" and legislative history
confirms that Congress intended hospital-specific rates also to be set in advance.6'
(1) Essential Characteristics
The importance of an unalterably fixed rate to the new payment system
must be considered more critically, however. Precisely what is meant by referring to this system as "prospective" rather than "retrospective"? A useful
starting point is the Secretary of Health and Human Services' description of
the defects in the old system and the reforms in the new:
Currently Medicare reimburses hospitals under a cost-based system. In
cost-based reimbursement, hospitals are paid essentially whatever they
spend.. There is no incentive for hospitals to operate more efficiently
since all allowable costs are fully reimbursed. In fact, cost-based reimbursement encourages just the opposite behavior. The larger a hospital's
costs, the larger will be its Medicare reimbursement. Thus, there exists
an incentive
to spend because the current system provides no incentive
2
to save.1
This system is referred to as retrospective cost-based reimbursement. It is
retrospective in the sense that reimbursement is calculated after a patient's

58.
59.

49 Fed. Reg. 234, 259 (1985).
St. Francis Hosp. v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 697, 700 (4th Cir. 1986).

60.

42 U.S.C. S 1395ww(dX6) (Supp. I1 1985).
The House Conference Report states that "the hospital's specific portion of the rate must
be determined in advance of the hospital's first fiscal year." H.R. REP. No. 47, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 182, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 404, 472. The Secretary's report to
61.

Congress on PPS listed as one of the "four essential characteristics" of PPS rates that "they are

determined in advance and fixed for the fiscal period to which they apply." REPoRT "To CONGREss,
supra note 4.
62. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 61, at i.
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treatment by asking the hospital what services it chose to provide. It is costbased because the measure of the reimbursement is the expenditures the hospital
chose to make. Compare this payment system with the "four essential characteristics" of payment under the new system. Under PPS, payment rates are:
[FirstI determined in advance and fixed for the fiscal period to which
they apply. Second, the payment rates for any individual hospital are
not automatically determined by the level, or the pattern, of its present
or past incurred costs or charges for services. Third, prospective rates
are payment in full for the specified unit of service. Finally, the hospital
keeps the difference between the payment rate and its cost of providing
the service and is at risk for exceeding the payment rates.'3
It is the first characteristic, the fixed, predetermined nature of the payment
rate, that HCFA seeks to preserve by banning retroactive correction of the rate.
But consider how essential this characteristic actually is to the operation of PPS
by examining the remaining characteristics. The second eliminates the relevancy
of individual hospitals' actual costs because it removes the subjectivity of the
old system and bases payment on objective factors. The third and fourth characteristics are intended to give hospitals an incentive to behave like efficient
firms in a competitive market. Because hospitals receive a set payment that
reimburses them for each patient treated, they are at risk for costs that exceed
this rate. They also stand to profit if their costs are below the rate. Consequently, they have a profit/risk oriented incentive to contain costs.
Taken together, then, the second, third, and fourth characteristics fully address the defects of the preexisting system of retrospective cost-based reimbursement. The basis for payment is no longer cost, and hospitals are no longer
guaranteed full reimbursement for all services rendered. The first characteristic
apparently adds nothing of substance to the new system. What is the relevance,
then, of the advance setting of payment rates? Its importance lies only in the
mechanics of the administration of reimbursement. Hospital payment rates are
no longer determined after treatment; they are established prospectively at the
beginning of each year. Therefore, hospital and government budgets are more
predictable than under a system where the amount of payment is determined
retrospectively, i.e., only after the fact of treatment.
To recapitulate, there are two senses in which the new payment system is
"prospective": structural and mechanical, or substantive and procedural. Structurally, payment is prospective in the sense that the basis for payment is objective, predetermined, and not within the control of individual hospitals.
Procedurally, the amount of payment is more predictable because rates are set
in advance. It is only the second sense of prospectivity that is addressed by
the prospective relief rule. But budget predictability is not an essential characteristic of the new system's operation. This is perhaps best illustrated by
analogy.

63. Id. at 15.
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Christmas Trees

The overriding goal of PPS is to create incentives for hospitals to behave
like efficient firms in a competitive market. Consider hypothetically a firm selling;
Christmas trees in a competitive market. Suppose the operator of this Christmas
tree lot knows in advance that she and her competitors will not receive their
first shipment of trees until December 1st. The seller wants to begin the season
with an advertising blitz starting on the weekend before the first delivery, but
she does not know in advance what the market price will be. To attract pricesensitive consumers with her advertisement, she projects market prices and guarantees that her advertised prices will not be beaten. A week into the season,
she learns she has miscalculated the market price; trees are selling for five
dollars less than she quoted in her advertisement. Thus, she lowers her prices
and rebates five dollars to every first week buyer who comes back to the lot.
The operator is behaving efficiently in a competitive market yet she does
not know her prices in advance; in fact she retroactively corrects her prices.
Conversely, the prospective payment system, which is designed to simulate competitive market conditions, appears to depend on payment rates set in advance.
The resolution of this paradox is found in classic microeconomic theory, which
explains that in a competitive market no firm has control over the market
price.64 The price is set "objectively" by the aggregated behavior, costs, and
preferences of each consumer and firm, "invisible" forces that are outside the
control of any individual firm. A characteristic of competitive markets then, is
that, as each firm faces the market, the market price is a given; each firm is
a "price taker." But the particular price level is not absolutely fixed; firms
have no assurance the price will not change. Indeed, they are at the mercy of
market fluctuations. This uncertainty, however, does not eliminate the incentives
controlling the behavior of competitive firms. The prevailing price affects a
firm's behavior only at the initial decision to enter the market. Thereafter,
although firms project price changes, their incentives do not change if their
price expectations are disappointed. They will profit if they gain a competitive
advantage in production costs or product quality and will suffer losses if they
lag behind.
Thus, absolutely predetermined prices are not a necessary characteristic of
competitive markets. 65 The essential characteristic is the objectivity of prices,
that is, the lack of control that particular firms have over the market price.
This explanation applies to PPS hospitals as well. 6 6 In emulating a competitive

64.

P.

SAMUELSON,

ECONOMics 43 (10th ed.

1976).

65. Another illustration may be useful at this point. Consider a stock market investor who,
because of Friday's rise in the price of ABC stock, tells her broker over the weekend to sell 100
shares when the market opens on Monday, even though the opening price may be higher or lower
than Friday's close. The investor is prospectively tied to a price, but because the price is not yet

determined, her initial pricing assumption is subject to retroactive correction. Likewise, for a hospital
under PPS, retroactive correction of its initial payment rate does not destroy the prospective aspect
of the system because the hospital is still prospectively tied to whatever rate is externally generated
by the administrative system.
66. Because PPS does not place hospitals in an actual competitive environment, but rather
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market, PPS removes from hospitals' control the amount of reimbursement they
receive. Hospitals, thus, become "price takers." PPS does this by setting hospital reimbursement without regard to particular costs. Perfect prior knowledge
of the precise level of reimbursement is not an essential component of this
mechanism. The D.C. Circuit is simply wrong when it says that "the key to
the PPS system is the hospital's advance knowledge of the amount of payment
it will receive. '" 7 Knowing the precise level of the reimbursement rate in advance is no more relevant to hospitals' behavior than it is to the behavior of
competitive firms. Consequently, retroactive correction of payments received for
patients treated under PPS would not undermine the operation of the system.
Uncertainty as to the ultimate amount to be received will not make hospitals
lax in their cost 'containment efforts because they understand that whatever they
receive will be payment in full. Therefore, they will still be at risk for excess
costs and will stand to profit from surplus payment. 6s
The legislative history confirms this understanding of prospectivity. According to the House of Representatives' general description of the prospective
payment system:
The bill is intended to improve the medicare program's ability to act
as a prudent purchaser of services, and to provide predictability regarding
payment amounts for both the Government and hospitals. More important, it is intended to reform the financial incentives hospitals face, promoting efficiency in the provision of services by rewarding cost-effective
hospital practices." 9
As explained, the advance setting of rates is a mere administrative housekeeping
detail related to predicting the agency's and hospitals' budgets. It is unrelated
attempts to replicate incentives that exist in a competitive market, hospital incentives are not
precisely the same as those for firms in a competitive market. Ordinarily, a firm that obtains a
competitive advantage may seek to enhance its profits by retaining the increased net income at its
existing level of production, or by increasing its level of production. It might accomplish the latter
either by decreasing prices or by increasing the quality of its product. Hospitals that achieve new
efficiencies are not able to increase production by decreasing prices because prices are irrelevant
to Medicare consumers as long as the Government pays the reimbursement. Efficient hospitals
may, however, either retain their increased profits or increase their production by increasing quality.
If they do the former, the lowered costs of production ultimately result in savings to the Medicare
program when new reimbursement rates are calculated based on new average cost levels. If hospitals
engage in quality competition, however, this effect will be dampened or counteracted.
67. Washington Hosp. Sys. v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1986). That this statement was made in the context of assessing the validity of a different appeal rule demonstrates the
pervasive analytical importance of having a clear understanding of the essence of prospectivity.
68. Even assuming retroactive increases in payment would affect a hospital's behavior, this
effect would appear to favor HCFA. Hospitals with incorrect PPS rates will likely behave in an
excessively cost-conscious fashion because their rates will be set deceptively low. Therefore, HCFA
will obtain a windfall of sorts if rates are not retroactively corrected. The only conceivable basis
on which a retroactive adjustment might cause inefficient behavior is through the speculation that
a hospital would anticipate at the outset an ultimate retroactive correction and therefore would incur
unnecessary costs because it would be less rigorously cost conscious. Such speculative behavior is
too unlikely to be significant.
69. H.R. REP. No. 25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 132, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CoNG. &
AD. NEws 219, 351.
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to the "more important" substantive concern of reforming financial incentives
in the hospital industry. This is even clearer in the Senate Report which discusses only the financial incentives and omits any mention of budget predictability.70
The administrative concern of predictability is met by setting rates and DRG
weights in advance and then making payments throughout the year as patients
are discharged. But even this explanation gives the mechanical sense of prospectivity too much prominence. Under PPS, hospitals do not know in advance
how much they will receive for the year, or even how much they will receive
for each patient. The amount of payment depends on several "retrospective"
factors, such as how many patients are admitted and the DRGs to which they
are assigned. The old system of cost-based reimbursement was not entirely
unpredictable. Hospitals knew in advance that the basis for reimbursement was
their costs. They also knew the costs they could claim were to some extent
limited. They had to spend reasonably in their treatment, as measured by
objective principles of what a prudent hospital would spend or what was within
the range of reasonable medical practice. 71 Thus, even in their mechanical details,
retrospectivity and prospectivity are not absolutes under either system; they are
matters of degree.Y2 There are elements of each in both systems. These are
convenient labels behind which hide the essentials of both systems.
Shedding the veil of these superficial labels, it is clear that PPS does not
depend on an absolutely fixed, predetermined rate. The essence of prospectivity
is not predetermination. Even if it were, absolute predictability is impossible
under PPS due to the uncertainties of the numbers of patients and their DRG
classifications. Therefore, retroactive correction of errors in PPS rates in no
sense undermines the new system.
Seen in this light, HCFA is incorrect in denying retroactive relief in a
prospective payment system. According to Emerson, "A foolish consistency is
the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by statesmen and philosophers and divines.' '7" Denying retroactive relief in base year appeals to maintain consistency
with the prospective payment system is just such a hobgoblin.
b.

An Inconsistent Rationale: Retroactive "Modifications"

Viewing HCFA's position from a different perspective, HCFA's concern for
preserving prospectivity is disingenuous when compared with other areas where
retroactive rate adjustments are allowed. HCFA's inconsistency affects the cred70. S. REP. No. 23, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 47, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 143, 187.
71. See 42 U.S.C. S 1395x(v) (Supp. I 1985); 42 C.F.R. 5 405.451 (1985); 1 MEDICARE
& MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
5858.
72. Washington Hosp. Center v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139 (D.C. Cir. 1986), is an cxamplc of
the failure to realize this. The court treats the two systems as polar opposites because it fails to
focus on the variability of payment under PPS according to the number of patients and their
illnesses.
73. R. EMERSON, Self Reliance, in COMPLETE ESSAYS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF R. EMERSON

152 (1940).
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ibility of its premise concerning the fragile nature of prospectivity. HOFA premises that if the new system is to function, there must be absolute certainty as
to the PPS rate. If this is true, HCFA has already undermined prospectivity
because it has subjected PPS rates to retroactive correction in respects other
than base year cost errors.
74
PPS rates are subject to retroactive adjustment in two important respects.
First, if a hospital successfully challenges the calculation of the national/regional
portion of the rate, then relief can be granted retroactive to the first date the
erroneous rate was used. The prospective relief rule applies to only the hospitalspecific portion of the rate. Second, even with regard to the hospital-specific
rate, H(FA's rules allow retroactive adjustment if a hospital establishes an
error in one of the "modifications" made to base year costs in conforming
them to the current system. This requires further discussion.
Base year costs (from which the hospital-specific rate is calculated) contain
items that are not reimburseable under PPS and they omit other items that
are legitimate expenditures under PPS. For example, in 1982, hospitals which
were excluded from mandatory Social Security taxes now must make these
payments. The base year costs, therefore, must be modified upward to account
for these extra costs that exist only during PPS. On the other hand, base year
costs might contain capital-related costs or, for teaching hospitals, medical education costs, which must be removed from the base year calculation because
these costs are not paid under PPS; they are reimbursed directly. 75 If a hospital
successfully appeals the amount of such "modifications," Medicare regulations
provide that "the intermediary will recalculate the hospital's base-year costs . . .
effective retroactively to the time of the intermediary's initial estimation of base7
year costs." "

The rationale for retroactively correcting "modifications"

to base year costs

but not the initial calculation of base year costs is difficult to understand. Nevertheless, an argument for this policy can be made. The best justification 77 for
74. Base year costs are subject to retroactive adjustment in other more minor respects. Set
42 C.F.R. S 4 12 .72 (lXiv) (1985) (inadvertent omissions recognized by the intermediary within 30
days); id. S 412.71(2) (mathematical errors caught within 90 days); id. S 412.71(4) (recovery of
excess payments made because of unlawfully claimed costs as determined by a criminal prosecution
or expulsion from the Medicare program).
Congress recently enacted a PPS rate adjustment for sole community hospitals that have experienced significant cost increases since their base years. The legislation allows qualified hospitals
to apply the correction retroactively to October 1, 1983. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, S 9111, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws (100 Stat.)
82, 162 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(dX5XcXii)). This provision strongly evidences Congressional
recognition that retroactive corrections do not necessarily destroy the prospectivity of Medicare's payment system.
75. See generally 42 C.F.R. 5 412.71 (1985); HEALTH CARE FINANCINa ADMIN., PROVIDER
REIMBURSEMENT MANUAL S 2802, reprinte in I MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
4255, at
1537-39 [hereinafter cited as HCFA MANUAL].
76.

42 C.F.R. S 412.72(aX4) (1985).

77. Another possible explanation is based on the use of two different appeal routes to correct
the calculation of base year costs and the modification of base year costs. If base year costs are
incorrectly calculated, they may be corrected in a direct appeal from the 1982 cost report. If base

year costs are incorrectly "modified" in the process of obtaining the hospital-specific rate, the error
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the differentiation is in the nature of the evidence on which a hospital might
seek to correct the two determinations. In many cases intermediaries were forced
to estimate 1982 costs to obtain the hospital-specific rate because the 1982 cost
report audits were not completed before the start of PPS. 7 Finalizing the cost

report settlement process might bring forth new information that was not available at the time the hospital-specific rate was set. Therefore, HCFA might be
forced to correct these rates based on such new information. In contrast, there
is no after-the-fact review of base year modifications providing an opportunity
to generate new data relevant to the modifications. If these modifications are
to be corrected, it is only on the basis of information that was available to the
fiscal intermediary at the time of calculation.79 Arguably, this justifies retroactive
correction for one but not for the other. Insisting on a correction effective back
to the date of the original determination where the correction is based on
unavailable information is unfair. This appears to be one of HCFA's justifications for the prospective relief rule. s"'
cannot be corrected until the 1984 PPS appeal. Therefore, one might think that hospitals have a
much better opportunity to correct their base year costs prior to the start of PPS than they do to
obtain an early correction of their base year modifications. Indeed, because the hospital-specific
rate is the same as the TEFRA target amount, and TEFRA was already in effect prior to PPS,
one might expect that the base year rate should automatically have been determined prior to PPS.
If this distinction in the timing of potential appeals in fact exists, then disparate application of the
prospective relief rule might be justified. The factual premise in this argument is, however, not
true. There is only one year between the end of a hospital's base year and the beginning of its
first PPS year. It usually takes at least this one year to obtain a final notice of reimbursement
and commence the 1982 appeal. Many hospitals could not commence their 1982 base year appeals
until after they had received notice of their PPS hospital-specific rate; in other words, the intermediaries merely estimated 1982 costs in order to obtain a hospital-specific rate in time for the
start of PPS because they had not yet completed their audits of 1982 cost reports. Set, e.g., Doctor's
Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 1036, 1040 (S.D. Fla. 1985). These hospitals may
have less of an opportunity to appeal their base year costs than they do to correct base year
modifications. Thus, there is no significant or consistent timing difference in the calculation of base
year costs and the calculation of base year modifications that would justify denying retroactive relief
to corrections in one but not in the other.
78. See 42 C.F.R. S 412.71(d) (1985) ("The intermediary will use the best data available at
the time in estimating each hospital's base-year costs ... ."). HCFA's instructions to intermediaries
emphasize in capital letters that "INTERMEDIARIES WILL PROCEED WITH COMPLETING
THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM BASE PERIOD AND TARGET AMOUNT CALCULATIONS . . . EVEN IF THERE IS ANY DELAY WITH . . . COMPUTATION OF.
• . BASE PERIOD COSTS." HCFA MANUAL, supra note 75, S 2802, reprinted in 1 MEDICARE &
MEDICAID GUIDE at 1536.

79. 42 C.F.R. S 412.72(bX2) (1985).
80. HCFA's explanation is hardly clear. See 49 Fed. Reg. 234, 259-60 (1984):
[T]he proper scope of review of adjustments [modifications?] to base year costs is extremely
narrow . . . .Additional data, information, and arguments cannot properly be subsequently
developed and presented during the review process ...
In the event that a provider demonstrates during the review process that the calculation
of [modification to?] its hospital-specific portion was contrary to law or clearly not based
on the best data available at the time, a revision retroactive to the beginning of the
transition period would be appropriate and is authorized by the regulations [but with regard
to "modifications" only] . . . [E]quity suggests that full relief should be afforded to the
provider.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol38/iss3/3

18

Hall: Rate Appeals Under Medicare's New Payment System: Reflections on
1986]

RATE APPEALS UNDER PPS

HCFA's rationale is inadequate for several reasons. First, it relies on HCFA's
own slowness in closing out the base year cost report. The confusion of having
to estimate base year costs results only because the cost report auditing system
is not more efficient. If 1982 cost reports had been settled before the 1983 start
of PPS, as was possible, hospital-specific rates would be based on the same
information as 1982 final notices of reimbursement. Thus, this disparity with
regard to uncovering new data would not exist.
HCFA would respond that Congress contemplated the necessity of estimating
base year costs. The House Conference Report contains the following statement:
Since the hospital's specific portion of the rate must be determined in
advance of the hospital's first fiscal year under the system, the managers
[of the joint conference] expect the Secretary will use the best data available
at the time to determine operating costs for the purposes of the phasein.81

Read in context, however, this statement refers to the base year cost modifications that form part of the rate. The statement does not apply to the entire
hospital-specific rate. The preceding sentence of the report states:
The managers recognize that, in some cases, the Secretary will have to
use estimates to adjust [i.e. "modify"] some portions of the hospital's
base year experience to make it comparable to inpatient operating costs that will
be paid under the prospective system e.g. FICA taxes that would have
been paid if the hospital had been in the social security system . .
2
Congress contemplated the use of "estimates" and reliance on the "best
data available" only to the limited extent of modifications."" Determining the
PPS rate in advance necessitates estimating base year modifications. To know
the precise amount of the modification that would make the base year costs
perfectly comparable with the PPS system, the costs experienced under PPS
would have to be measured. For instance, to know precisely how much to
increase base year costs to account for hospitals' new Social Security tax responsibility, it would be necessary to wait and measure those new costs. But
waiting would be inconsistent with setting a rate in advance. Therefore, Congress instructed HCFA to use estimates for these modifications. Calculating the
1982 base year costs themselves, however, does not require HCFA to wait, or

Where, however, better information is developed for reasons independent of the pro-

spective payment system, that is, [through] the appeal of disallowed base year costs [i.e.,
appeal of the 1982 cost report], we believe that it is acceptable to consider that information
on a prospective basis [only].

81.

H.R.

REP.

No. 47, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 182, reprined in 1983 U.S.

CODE CONG.

&

AD. Nsvs 404, 472 (emphasis added).

82. Id., reprinted in 1983 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 471-72.
83. The D.C. Circuit is thus incorrect when it asserts with no authority that "Congress
authorized the Secretary to rely on estimates of base year costs rather than wait for issuance of
the base year [reimbursement notice]." Washington Hosp. Center v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 148
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
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to use estimates, since the actual costs are available for measurement a full
year prior to PPS.
To summarize, the availability of later information on which to correct base
year cost estimates does not justify refusing retroactive corrections. These costs
should not have been estimated in the first place. The costs should have been
established through completion of the cost report settlement process before PPS
started. Even if HOFA's estimate rationale were solid, the prospective relief
rule remains overbroad because it also bars retroactive relief to those hospitals
that establish base year errors based on data that was available to the intermediaries. Some hospital-specific rates were established based on final 1982 costs
because the cost reports were settled in time. Moreover, even hospitals under
an estimate may show "that the calculation of [their] hospital-specific portion
was contrary to law or clearly not based on the best data available at the time."
In these cases, as HOFA concedes in its rulemaking, "equity suggests that full
relief should be afforded to the provider.' "'4
Since preserving the system's administrative prospectivity is not essential to
its operation and since prospectivity is undermined in any event by the retroactive relief available elsewhere, preserving prospectivity is not a sufficient
rationale for refusing retroactive relief. Perhaps other rationales proffered by
HCFA will be found to be more compelling.
2.

Budget Neutrality

HCFA's second justification for the prospective relief rule is that granting
retroactive relief would destroy "budget neutrality." The concept of budget
neutrality is contained in the statutory provision requiring HOFA to adjust the
PPS rate for the first two years so that hospitals as a whole receive the same
total compensation under PPS as they would have received under the pre-existing
system.a' HCFA reasons that if the rates were adjusted to achieve budget neutrality with the expectation that they would not be corrected, it would upset
the complex estimation of budget neutrality to change the rates retroactively."'
The obvious solution, however, is to anticipate rate corrections by including in
the budget neutrality calculation an estimate of base year cost errors. This
estimation would be no more difficult or uncertain than the other speculative
projections made in the budget neutralizing process, such as determining whether
hospital admissions will remain the same under PPS, approximating the patterns
in the variations of cost increases that would have existed under the prior system
across various hospitals and estimating the 1982 base year costs themselves from
1981 data.17 Refusing rate corrections in order to protect budget neutrality is
84.

49 Fed. Reg. 234, 259 (1984); accord Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Bowen, 4 MEDICARE &
GUIDE (CCH)
35,880, at 12,431 (D.S.C. Sept. 16, 1986).
85. 42 U.S.C. S 1395ww(eX 1) (Supp. III 1985).
86. See 49 Fed. Reg. 234, 259 (1984).
87. See id. at 331-33. HCFA also used estimates or projections to account for hospitals entering
PPS on a staggered basis. Furthermore, the difference between TEFRA and PPS concerning the
shift of certain costs from Part B to Part A under new regulations governing payment for hospitalbased physician charges likewise required the use of projections. Id. at 331-32.
MEDICAID
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allowing the tail to wag the dog. HCFA certainly could not mandate that
hospitals maintain precisely the same patient admission levels under PPS simply
so that HCFA would not have to consider this complication in its budget
neutralizing calculation, yet this is what it attempts to do in refusing to make
any present corrections of base year cost errors.
A second response is that any imbalance in the budget neutrality estimate
caused by retroactive correction of base year costs is partially self-correcting.
Base year costs are relevant under the pre-existing system, as well as under
PPS. The transitional form of reimbursement enacted just prior to PPS is a
modified cost-based system known as TEFRA. Under TEFRA cost-based reimbursement, base year costs establish a "target amount." Each hospital's actual
costs are measured against this target amount. If a hospital's costs are above
its target amount, it is penalized twenty-five percent of the difference; if its
actual costs are below the target amount, it is rewarded with fifty percent of
the TEFRA difference."a The base year costs that determine the TEFRA target
amount are subject to appeal and correction as are hospital-specific rates under
PPS. Under TEFRA, however, there is no prospective relief rule and thus no
prohibition of retroactive corrections. Every base year cost correction a PPS
hospital establishes in its hospital-specific rate would have resulted in a retroactive
correction to its TEFRA target amount and, therefore, to its reimbursement
under TEFRA. Since the same base year costs determine both PPS rates and
TEFRA target amounts, there is an inherent balancing effect for retroactive
adjustments under PPS. If a hospital establishes an error in its PPS hospitalspecific rate, it would have received retroactive correction of the same error in
its TEFRA target amount because the target amount is determined by the same
base year costs. Under TEFRA, however, the correction has only twenty-five
percent or fifty percent of the effect as under PPS (depending on whether the
hospital's actual costs would have been above or below its target amount). The
match between TEFRA and PPS, therefore, is not perfect.
Even so, the mathematical phenomenon inherent in the linkage between
TEFRA and PPS means that an unbalancing effect results from either a prospective relief rule or a retroactive relief rule."" A prospective relief rule undercorrects base year errors and a retroactive relief rule overcorrects. Thus, the
unbalancing effect is not solved by the prospective relief rule. The solution is
to estimate the amount of the corrections in the budget neutralizing process.
In any event, to the extent the budget neutrality rationale has validity, it
applies only to retroactive adjustments during 1984 and 1985, since the statute
requires budget neutrality for only the first two years of PPS. It is, therefore,

88.
89.

42 U.S.C. S 1395ww(bXl) (Supp. III 1985). See supra note 3.
The unbalancing effect appears to be somewhat less under the prospective relief rule than

under a retroactive relief rule. For those hospitals over their target amounts, a prospective relief
rule fails to offset a 25% retroactive correction under TEFRA while a retroactive relief rule would
overbalance TEFRA by 75%. The aggregate magnitude of this differential would depend on the

number of hospitals that would have been above their TEFRA target amounts. If all hospitals
would have been below, there would be no differential between the unbalancing effect of the two
rules because the TEFRA reward is an even 50%. See 42 U.S.C. S 1395ww(d) (Supp. III 1985).
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unfair to impose the prospective relief rule indefimitely, particularly to hospitals
classified as "sole community providers" which remain on a hospital-specific
rate indefinitely.' Thus, HCFA's second explanation, budget neutrality, is also
seriously flawed.
3.

Inappropriate Fine-tuning

HCFA's final explanation for the prospective relief rule is that retroactive
correction of base year costs would be "inappropriate fine-tuning of an inherently crude transitional payment factor.'" HCFA relies on the House Conference Report statement that hospital-specific rates will be based on "estimates"
derived from the "best data available" at the time.9 2 HCFA argues that rates
determined in advance based on estimates do not have to be revised at all, let
alone retroactively, once the estimated facts are known with certainty."' This
argument is defective for the reasons already discussed.94 The House Conference
Committee quotation refers only to "adjustments" (i.e., modifications) to the
base year costs, which concededly are not subject to later correction based on
new data. The legislative history and the statutory scheme do not indicate that
anything other than the hospital's actual base year costs are to be used. An
estimate or projection is not necessary because the conclusive information is
available before PPS through the cost report. To the extent it is administratively
difficult to process this information fully before the start of PPS, Congress gave
no specific direction, but the most reasonable assumption is that Congress intended for the estimate to be corrected.
4.

Crux of the Issue

Despite its deficiency, this last argument points in the direction of the fundamental motivation behind HCFA's ruling. In its "inappropriate fine-tuning"
explanation HCFA reasons that fairness arguments in favor of any correction
to the hospital-specific rate must be balanced against the administrative costs
involved. HCFA draws that balance to grant prospective corrections only. But
implicit in HCFA's position is the contention that it could, if it chose, deny
any correction altogether. This explanation is potentially the most powerful of
those considered. If HCFA has the authority to refuse any correction to the
hospital-specific rate, then it must also have the lesser-included authority to
refuse retroactive correction. As HCFA would view it, its position is favorable
to hospitals because HCFA allows at least prospective relief.
Recent litigation involving another PPS appeal rule reveals that this argument is at the heart of HCFA's position on retroactive relief. In four recent
90. Id. S 1395ww(dX5XCXii); seeRedbud Hosp. Dist. v. Heckler, [1984-2 Transfer Binder]
(CCH)
34,085 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 1984).
91. 49 Fed. Reg. 234, 259 (1984).
92. See supra text accompanying note 81.
93. See, e.g., Villages of Chatham & Riverton v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, 662 F.2d
23, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Indiana Mun. Elec. Ass'n v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, 629 F.2d
480, 482-83 (7th Cir. 1980).
94. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE
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cases, HCFA stated that it will allow hospitals to raise base year cost errors
both in their 1982 base year appeals and in their subsequent PPS appeals, in
essence waiving normal rules of administrative res judicata. 5 This is significant
because the prospective relief rule apparently applies only to appeals froin hospitals' 1982 cost reports2 6 Thus, HCFA contends that hospitals "will be made
whole""' 7 in their direct PPS appeals, despite the prohibition of retroactive relief
,in their base year appeals.
This apparent concession is a Trojan Horse. Hidden within is another regulation which HCFA contends sharply limits the grounds on which hospitalspecific rates can be corrected during direct PPS appeals." HCFA allows such
correction "only if the estimation was unreasonable and clearly erroneous99 in
light of the data available at the time the estimation was made."" HCFA
excludes from review "any issues based on data, information, or arguments
not presented to the intermediary at the time of the estimation." ' " Effectively,
what HCFA has done, then, is to expand rather than restrict the prospective
relief rule. Rather than banning merely retroactive correction of erroneous estimates of base year costs, it has barred any such correction, prospective or
retrospective, if the error is revealed through subsequent information developed
during the 1982 cost report auditing and appeal process. HOFA has deceptively
taken back with one hand more than it has given with the other.
HOFA reasons that correction of base year cost estimates based on post hoc
information would be inappropriate fine-tuning. For this reasoning to be valid,
hospitals' rights to correct their hospital-specific rates must be subject to HCFA's
control. However, if the premise is false, that is, if the statute gives hospitals
the right to appeal and correct hospital-specific rates, then HCFA cannot compromise that right for administrative convenience. Administrative convenience
is relevant only if hospitals' appeal rights are subject to HOFA's discretion.
Viewing HCFA's position in its most extreme form makes it much easier
to determine the validity of the prospective relief rule. The rule cannot be valid
because hospitals have an unqualified statutory right to appeal and correct their
hospital-specific rates. " " Both the national/regional rate and the hospital-specific
95.

St. Francis Hosp. v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 697, 702 n.8 (4th Cir. 1986); Washington Hosp.

Center v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 149 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Charter Medical Corp. v. Bowen,
788 F.2d 728, 734-35 (11th Cir. 1986); Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Bowen, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID
GUIDE (CCH)

1

35,880, at 12,432 (D.S.C. Sept. 11, 1986).

96. Ste supra note 34. The rule is written in the context of recognizing additional costs
"allowable for the hospital's base year," i.e., giving effect in the PPS rate to corrections made in
the audit of the 1982 cost report.
97.

Charter Medical Corp. v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 728, 735 (l1th Cir. 1986).
MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)

98. Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Bowen, 4
12,432 (D.S.C. Sept. 16, 1986).

35,880, at

99. To the extent that this is intended to alter the statutorily determined standard of judicial
review, it is clearly invalid. Id. This article, however, is concerned with the remainder of the
regulation which limits the issues on review by excluding them entirely from consideration.
100. 42 C.F.R. S 412.72(b)(2) (1985).
101. Id. S 412.72(b)(3).
102. 42 U.S.C. S 1395oo(a) (Supp. III 1985); accord Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Bowen, 4
MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
35,880, at 12,432 (D.S.C. Sept. 16, 1986).
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rate are subject to correction through a Review Board appeal. Congress was
sensitive to hospital appeal rights as shown by its careful crafting of exceptions
to judicial review under PPS. '111 While Congress left the task of fashioning

procedural details of appeal mechanisms to the agency, it did not allow the
agency to compromise these rights by denying the right to correct mistakes in
hospital-specific rates.
HCFA concedes as much: "we recognize that a provider is entitled to have
its hospital-specific portion calculated in accordance with law, and we do not
wish to preclude rectifying calculations that were made contrary to law."M04
HCFA errs in thinking that this entitlement extends only to an estimation of
the base year costs or that it is subject to compromise by administrative convenience concerns. Neither assumption is correct. Hence, the prospective relief
rule and its recent reinterpretation are invalid.

III.

THE TIMING OF PROVIDER RATE APPEALS

Timing is the second critical aspect of provider appeals.'"" The second half
of this article thus examines whether it is consistent with the prospectivity of
the new payment system to delay rate appeals until long after the end of each
PPS year.
A.

Introduction

Under the old system of retrospective cost-based reimbursement, "" a hospital
filed a "cost report" at the end of each fiscal year. The fiscal intermediary
used the cost report to determine the amount of the hospital's reimbursement."' 7
The intermediary audited the report, using a complex accounting process to
allocate between Medicare patients and private patients the numerous items of
indirect and overhead costs that hospitals incur. The intermediary also determined which items were reimburseable costs."" After the intermediary completed
the final settlement of the cost report, it issued a "notice of program reimbursement" (reimbursement notice) as its final determination of the amount of
payment for the year."' This notice triggered a hospital's right to appeal to
103.
104.

42 U.S.C. S 1395ww(d)(7) (Supp. III 1985).
49 Fed. Reg. 234, 259 (1984).

105. Another appeal provision worth passing mention is 42 C.F.R. $ 412.72(bXl) (1985).
An intermediary's estimation of a hospital's base-year costs, and modifications, made for
purposes of determining the hospital-specific rate, are subject to administrative and judicial
review . .. but only with respect to whether the intermediary followed the provisions of
[these regulations].

Id. (emphasis added). To the extent that this rule purports to preclude review of the validity of
the referenced regulations, it is clearly contrary to the statutory grant of appeal rights in 42 U.S.C.
S 1395oo(a) (Supp. III 1985).

106. The cost reimbursement system still exists with respect to hospitals that are exempt from
PPS (psychiatric, rehabilitation, and long-term hospitals), for capital cost reimbursement, and for
exempt portions of PPS hospitals. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
107. 42 C.F.R. SS 405.406(b), .453() (1985).
108. See id. SS 405.402, .403, .414-.436.
109. Id. SS 405.1801(a)(1), .1803(a).
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the Review Board."" The Review Board considered any issue relating to the
cost report."'
This appeal system, structured around the cost reporting process, is not
adaptable to PPS because PPS does not depend on cost reports. When PPS is
fully implemented, cost reports will no longer be necessary.'2 In the interim,
HCFA may require different reports that serve different purposes. Therefore,
Congress amended the Review Board jurisdictional statute to provide for hospital
,appeals of PPS payment issues. " 3 One would anticipate that hospitals would
not be required to wait until the end of the year to appeal because the new
system is not retrospective. However, the statute is silent on this point. Surprisingly, HCFA has abandoned the fidelity to prospectivity that it displayed
in the prospective relief rule. Here, it has ruled that providers may not appeal
PPS issues until their cost reports have been audited and settled, long after the
end of the year."' To understand this controversy in full, a close examination
of the statute is necessary, followed by consideration of the validity of the various
positions that have been taken on the proper timing of PPS rate appeals.
The Review Board JurisdictionalStatute

B.

The amended Review Board jurisdictional statute states:
(a) Any provider of services which has filed a required cost report within
the time specified in regulations may obtain a hearing with respect to
such cost report by [the Review Board], .

.

and any hospital which

.

receives payments [under the TEFRA target amount system or under
PPSJ and which has submitted such reports within such time as the
Secretary may require in order to make payment under [TEFRA or
PPS] may obtain a hearing with respect to such payment by the Board,
if

-

(1) such provider (A)(i) is dissatisfied with a final determination .
amount of total program reimbursement .

.

.

.

as to the

for the period covered

by such report, or (ii) is dissatisfied with a final determination of the
Secretary as to the amount of payment under [TEFRA or PPS] ....
(2) the amount in controversy is $10,000 or more, and
(3) such provider files a request for a hearing within 180 days after
notice of the .

.

.

final determination[s] [referenced above]

42 U.S.C. S 1395oo(a) (Supp. III 1985); 42 C.F.R. S 405.1835(a) (1985 .
111. Review Board jurisdiction does not include determining individual patient payment disputes, which are resolved through another appeal mechanism available to patients and hospitals.
110.

42 U.S.C. S 1395oo(d), (g) (Supp. III 1985); see id.

SS

1395f(b), 1395pp(d). The Review Board

appeal process under cost reimbursement is discussed in Athens Community Hosp. Inc. v. Schweikcr, 743 F.2d 1, 2-4 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
112.

See 42 U.S.C. S 1395ww(O(1) (Supp. III 1985) (requiring cost reports only through 1988).

113. The amended statute also includes PPS-exempt hospitals within the new appeal mechanism
that are paid under the TEFRA target amount system, the precursor to PPS. See supra note 3 &

text accompanying note 88 (describing the TEFRA target amount system).
114. See infta note 119.
115. 42 U.S.C. S 1395oo (Supp. III 1985).
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Providers may then obtain judicial review of any final decision of the Board."'
The critical issue is when may providers bring PPS appeals to the Review
Board. HCFA has ruled that the statute requires providers to continue to await
their reimbursement notices for the PPS year before appealing issues relating
to prospective payment, just as they were required to do for cost-based reimbursement issues."17 Providers have successfully challenged HCFA's interpretation of the statute in several cases, contending that the statute allows them
to appeal at the beginning of their PPS years. These challenges have generally
arisen in the context of appeals of the hospital-specific portion of a hospital's
PPS rate," 8 but this question affects more than the PPS transition period. It
has arisen in cases involving whether a hospital is subject to rural or urban
hospital rates, whether a hospital is exempt or partially exempt from PPS, and
whether HCFA has correctly calculated the wage adjustment portion of the
prospective payment rate."'9 A careful analysis of the statute reveals that neither
interpretation is correct because the statute is fundamentally indeterminate on
the timing of PPS appeals.
1. A First Glance: Vagueness in the Appeal Structure
The statute's language regarding the timing of PPS appeals is remarkably
vague. A vast difference exists between the precision with which the statute
defines the cost reimbursement appeal process and the vague language describing
prospective payment appeals. For cost appeals, the statute precisely determines
116. Id. S 1395oo(f).
117. Health Care Financing Administration Ruling No. 84-1, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,413 (codified
at 42 C.F.R. S 412.72(b)); 42 C.F.R. S 40 5 .18 01(aX2)-(3) (1985):
With respect to a hospital that receives payments for inpatient hospital services under
the prospective payment system . . ., [intermediary determination] means a determination
of the total amount of payment due the hospital, pursuant to S 405.1803 following the
close of the hospital's cost reporting period, under that system for the period covered by
the determination.
For purposes of appeal to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board, [intermediary
determination] issynonymous with the phrases "intermediary's final determination" and
"final determination of the Secretary", as those phrases are used in section 1878(a) of the
Act.
118. St. Francis Hosp. v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1986); Washington Hosp. Center
v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Episcopal Hosp. v. Bowen, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID
GUIDE (CCH)
35,852 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 1986); Sunshine Health Sys., Inc. v. Heckler, No.
CV-85-953 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 1985); Doctor's Gen. Hosp. Inc. v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 1036
(S.D. Fla. 1985); Tucson Medical Center v. Heckler, 611 F. Supp. 823 (D.S.C. 1985); Greenville
Hosp. Sys. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 34,832 (D.S.C. July 19, 1985);
Redbud Hosp. Dist. v. Heckler, [1984-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
34,085 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 1984), applicationfor stay of injunction granted in part and denied in part,
106 S. Ct. 1 (1985); Healtheare Int'l, Inc. v. Memphis Hasp. Serv. & Surgical Ass'n, [1984-2
Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 34,214 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 27, 1984).
119. See, e.g., Good Samaritan Medical Center v. Secretary, 776 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1985);
Medical Center Hosp. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 34,920 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 23, 1985); cf. Redbud Hosp. Dist. v. Heckler, [1984-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
34,085 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 1984), application for stay of injunction granted in
part and denied in part, 106 S. Ct. 1 (1985).
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appeal procedures. It specifies the period of time under appeal ("the period
covered by [the cost] report" (one year)), the event triggering the appeal ("a
final determination . . . as to the amount of total program reimbursement"),

and the issues on appeal ("a hearing with respect to such cost report"). In
contrast, under prospective payment the statute merely provides that hospitals
may appeal "a final determination as to the amount of the payment." Many
obvious questions arise: Why is the word "total" omitted? What is the referrant
of "the" amount of payment? What amount of payment, covering what period
of time? PPS appeals require the timely submission of "such reports . . . as

the Secretary may require in order to make payment." The statute, however,
fails to explain which payments over what period of time. The issue on appeal
is "with respect to such payment," but what issues relating to what payment?
Presumably, this vagueness is not inadequate drafting but purposeful flexibility. The cost-appeal system was not added to the statute until 1972, five
years after Medicare's implementation. Congress, therefore, was able to tailor
an appeal procedure to fit precisely to the established cost reporting process.
In contrast, Congress did not know in 1983 exactly how HOFA would administer the prospective payment system. Therefore, the logical conclusion is
that Congress purposefully left the statutory appeal procedures for PPS in a
vague pre-formative stage. Congress imposed no time periods into which the
stream of PPS payments must be broken for purposes of administration or
appeal, and did not specify what reporting and auditing system must be used
because it preferred to leave such detail for development by the agency.
As a result, the statute is subject to a wide range of interpretations. At one
extreme, an argument can be made that a hospital should be allowed to bring
a PPS appeal each time it receives payment for an individual patient.'2" The
only "report required in order to make payment" is the bill the hospital sends
HOFA for each patient, and HCFA's payment of the bill is a "final determination as to the amount of payment." ' ' 2' It would be absurd for each bill
to constitute a Review Board appeal-triggering event, and no support has surfaced for this interpretion.' 2 2 Instead, two competing interpretations have been
advanced, each contending that PPS appeals should occur on a yearly basis.
HOFA's rule requires PPS appeals to be brought once a year after audit and
settlement of the cost report. Providers argue that appeals should be allowed
at the beginning of each year when hospitals receive notice of their new PPS
rates.
Thus, there is agreement at least on the point that PPS appeals should be
120. The hospital may, however, have trouble meeting the $10,000 jurisdictional amount. See
42 U.S.C. S 1395oo (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
121. At the other extreme, the statute may allow HCFA to require hospitals to wait five or
ten years, or indefinitely, before a required report is due or before it makes a final determination.
122. Among other arguments against such an interpretation is that the legislative history shows
that Congress intended appeal procedures to remain "general[ly]" the same as cost appeal procedures, which are structured annually. H.R. REP. No. 25, 98th Cong., IstSess. 143, reprinted in
1983 U.S. CooE CoNo.& AD. NEws 219, 362. This would also be inconsistent with the statutory
scheme, which elsewhere allows other appeal mechanisms for individual patient coverage disputes.
See 42 U.S.C. S 1395ff(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See also infra note 134.
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structured on an annual basis. This interpretation is a wise application of the
statute because PPS is structured annually in other respects as well. The onset
of the new system and the PPS transition years are governed by hospitals' fiscal
years. ' The setting of the national PPS rate and budget neutrality are governed
by HCFA's fiscal year. 2 4 It is harmonious, therefore, to structure PPS appeals
accordingly.
2.

A Closer Look

Agreement that PPS appeals should be structured on a yearly basis does
not resolve when the yearly appeal may be brought. A closer examination of
the Review Board jurisdiction -statute suggests two possible answers to this query.
a.

Amount of the Payment

Subsection (a)(1)(A)(ii) of the appeal statute refers to the "amount of the
payment under subsection (b) or (d) of section 1886 [TEFRA or PPS]." A
final determination of this amount triggers the right to appeal. This phrase is
defined in the very same subsection (d) of the PPS statute that is referenced
by the appeal statute.' 25 Subsection (d) provides that the "amount of the payment" to a hospital under PPS during the transition period is a blend of the
hospital-specific rate and the national/regional rate. '2 ' The "amount of the payment" after transition "is equal to the national adjusted DRG prospective
payment rate."'' 2 7 Under this definition, the appeal statute may be read to allow,
indeed require, providers to appeal at the beginning of each year, when they
receive a final determination of their hospital-specific and national/regional rates.
This analysis, adopted by the D.C. Circuit in Washington Hospital Center v.
Bowen,' " at first appears dispositive. The appeal statute uses the phrase "amount
of the payment," and the PPS subsection it references gives this phrase a precise
definition: the PPS rate. Upon close examination, however, this argument is
fallacious because it uses the term "rate" in two different senses.
123. 42 U.S.C. S 1395ww(d)(1XA) & (C) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 42 C.F.R. SS 412.6(aX1),
.70(c) (1985).
124. 42 U.S.C. S 1395ww(dX6) & (e)(l) (Supp. III 1985).
125. Id. S 1395ww(d)(1)(A).
126. [Tihe amount of the payment with respect to the operating costs of inpatient hospital services . . . for inpatient hospital discharges . . . in a fiscal year beginning on or
after October 1, 1983 . . . is equal to the sum of - (I) the target percentage . . . of
the hospital's target amount for the [year] . . . and (II) the DRG percentage . . . of the
regional adjusted DRG prospective payment rate determined under paragraph (2) for such
discharges ...
Id. S 1395ww(d)(1XA). Paragraph (2) describes how the "average standardized amount per discharge" nationally and regionally is calculated and how this amount combined with the appropriate
DRG weighting factor determines the national/regional "DRG prospective payment rate" for each
discharge. Id. S 1395ww(dX2).
127. Id. S 1395ww(d)(1XAXiii).
128. 795 F.2d 139 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The D.C. Circuit was recently followed by the Fourth
.Circuit as well, in St. Francis Hosp. v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 697, 700 (4th Cir. 1986) (referring to
the D.C. Circuit's "masterful explanation").
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The commonly understood meaning of "rate" is the average amount per
discharge that is multiplied by the DRG weighting factor to produce the amount
of payment for a particular patient.'29 Under this meaning the "amount of the
payment" is established at the beginning of the year. But this is not the meaning
of "rate" used in subsection (d) of the PPS statute, which defines "amount
of the payment." Subsection (d) refers to the "prospective payment rate determined under paragraph(2)for such discharges." 13" "Rate" must be understood, then,
as it is determined under paragraph (2) of subsection (d). That paragraph
explains that a rate is established "for each discharge" by calculating the national "average standardized amount" per discharge and multiplying this amount
by "the weighting factor . . .for that [patient's] diagnosis-related group."''

In other

words, the statute treats the "rate" as the product of the average amount per
discharge and the DRG weight, not as one of the factors in the multiplication.
Under this technical definition, the hospitals and the D.C. Circuit would
be wrong because there could be no final determination of the "amount of the
payment" (the average standardized amount per discharge times the DRG weight)
until a patient is treated, discharged, and assigned to a DRG. ' 2 HCFA would
also be wrong since "amount of the payment" refers to the amount for each
discharge, not the total of all discharges for the year. The statute would appear
to require the extreme position previously rejected that allows hospitals to bring
a PPS appeal after each patient is discharged.
Thus, tracking the definitional path of "amount of the payment" through
the maze of PPS subsections with their "semantic twists and turns"'"3 does not
produce a sensible understanding of when providers may appeal PPS issues.
The first definition encountered peculiarly suggests that "amount of payment"
means "rate." The next definition suggests that "rate" means payment per
individual patient. It is difficult to believe that Congress intended to chart such
a confusing course by referring in the appeal statute to the provisions describing
the mechanics of payment calculations. 34 A look at other aspects of the statute
might produce a sounder conclusion.
129.
130.

See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. S 412.73(e) (1985).
42 U.S.C. S 1395ww(d)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. III 1985).

131. Id. S 1395ww(d)(2)(G) (emphasis added).
132. The D.C. Circuit missed this point because it failed to focus on the role of individual
discharges and DRG assignments in the payment scheme. See Washington Hosp. Center v. Bowen,
795 F.2d 139, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("payment amounts . . .can be determined with finality
prior to the beginning of the .. .year").
133. Id. at 147.
134. Cf. Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 34,832,
at 9174 (D.S.C. July 19, 1985) (referring to HCFA's argument that there is a distinction between
"rate" and "amount of payment": "I find this to be a 'hypertechnical construction' of the statute.").

One persuasive reason for rejecting the technical reading of the statute that would favor HCFA's
position by defining "rate" to mean the payment for each individual patient is that this would
be inconsistent with the interpretation of the statute given by HCFA in its structuring of the
transition period payment mechanism. As noted earlier, HCFA has read the statute to mean that
the DRG weight is applied to both the hospital-specific and the standardized portions of the transition
period rate. See supra note 24. In order to reach this interpretation, it cannot accept literally the
incorporation of paragraph (2) into subsection (d)'s definition of "rate." See 42 U.S.C. S
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Cost Reports

HCFA has ruled that a hospital may not file a PPS appeal before receiving
notice settling the cost report for the year. Subsection (d) of the appeal statute,
which sets forth the Review Board's decisionmaking authority, supports this
position. The statute provides that the "[Review] Board shall have the power
to affirm, modify, or reverse a final determination of the fiscal intermediary
with respect to the cost report.t 113 This seems to require that a cost report be settled
before any appeal is brought. Perhaps Congress required PPS appeal procedures
to conform to cost appeal procedures and it amended subsection (a)3 6 of the
appeal statute only to bring PPS within the existing appeal structure.
This argument is just as unpersuasive as the "amount of payment" analysis
previously rejected. Reference in subsection (d) to only cost reports is an oversight. Congress did not intend to mandate cost reports for PPS appeals to
proceed because it recognized that such reports would be phased out under
PPS. 3 7 Moreover, cost reports are not "reports . . . require[d] in order to
make payment under [PPS]." Therefore, they do not fall within the precondition
to Review Board jurisdiction. Congress certainly undertook more than merely
conforming cost appeal procedures to PPS. 131 The amendment also encompasses
1395ww(d)(IXA)(iXII) (Supp. III 1985). Otherwise, HCFA would be forced to the construction
that the DRG weight is applied only to the standarized payment amount per discharge and not
to the hospital-specific target amount.
A final strong argument against giving "amount of payment" a technical reading and in favor of
a more colloquial understanding derives from the fact that the appeal statute does not govern only
PPS amounts of payment. Also included is the "amount of the payment under subsection (b),"
which is the TEFRA target amount system. Id. Under this system, "the amount of the payment"
is not determined until the end of the year when a hospital's actual operating costs are compared
with its target amount. It would be incongruous to adopt a construction of the statute that uses
the identical phrase to impose radically different appeal procedures on hospitals according to whether
they are under TEFRA or PPS, one structured annually and the other per discharge.

135.
136.

42 U.S.C. S 1395oo(d) (1982) (emphasis added).

See Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 34,832,
at 9173 (D.S.C. July 19, 1985). This suggestion is buttressed by the listing of the amendment in
the "conforming amendments" portion of the Act. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L.
No. 98-21, S 602(h)(1), 97 Stat. 165. The Senate and House Reports state that the Act will
"provide for the same procedures for administrative and judicial review of the payments under
the prospective system as is currently provided for cost-based payments. In general, the same
conditions, which now apply for review by the [Board] and the courts, would continue to apply."
H.R. REP. No. 25, 98th Cong. IstSess. 143, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
219, 362.
137. 42 U.S.C. S 1395ww()(1) (Supp. III 1985) (requiring cost reports until only 1988); H.R.
REP. No. 25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 143, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEws 219,
362 ("The prospective payment will no longer have any relationship to a hospital's actual costs.").
138. The legislative history cited supra note 136 is hardly conclusive. The portion that describes
PPS as governed by the same appeal procedures speaks only "[ijn general." H.R. REP. No. 25,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 143, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 219, 362. In general,
appeal procedures remain the same because, under either reading of the statute, both an appeal
to the Review Board from a final fiscal intermediary decision and a further appeal to court are
allowed annually. There is no indication that Congress expected PPS appeal procedures to remain
the same in their specifics. See Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE
(CCH) 34,832, at 9174 (D.S.C. July 19, 1985) ('In general' . . . implies that, 'in particular',
some of the conditions [for appealing] would change.").
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hospitals paid under the TEFRA target amount system, which was already in
existence at that time. Absent the PPS enactment, TEFRA target amount appeals would have been brought under the preamended cost appeal procedure.
Thus, by amending the statute, Congress intended to allow a different appeal
process to be designed for TEFRA and PPS hospitals. Otherwise, no amendment regarding TEFRA hospitals would be necessary because they were already
subject to cost appeal procedures. Even looking at the amendment's effect solely
on PPS hospitals, if Congress merely intended that PPS appeals be brought
after the cost report is settled, it could have said this directly. Instead, it opted
for language which allowed the flexibility of a new appeal- procedure.
3.

Conclusion

The statute and its legislative history reveal only that Congress contemplated
the creation of a separate, new PPS appeal procedure tailored to fit the prospective payment system. Beyond this, the statute is fundamentally and purposefully indeterminate. Congress did not itself create the new appeal structure.
Therefore, it did not specifically require or prohibit PPS appeals at the beginning of the year or after the cost report is settled. Congress left this timing
issue and other structural appeal issues to HCFA's discretionary rulemaking
powers. Thus, it is necessary to examine how wisely HCFA has exercised its
discretion.
C.

HCFA 's Position

Rather than create a new appeal mechanism, HCFA has incorporated PPS
issues within existing cost appeal procedures. ''9 It has created no new reporting
or year-end reconciliation process for PPS payments but instead relies on the
cost report to cover PPS as well. One advantage of this unitary system is
simplicity. It also avoids multiple appeals by preventing piecemeal appeal of
PPS issues separate from cost issues. At least until 1988, all hospitals under
PPS will continue to receive reimbursement for capital expenditures on an actual
cost basis and, therefore, will continue to have cost appeals. Thereafter, teaching
hospitals and hospitals with rehabilitation or psychiatric units will be paid partially under cost-based reimbursement.' 4' For these hospitals, HCFA's ruling
reduces the number of potential appeals from two to one.
This simplification, however, causes a substantial delay in bringing PPS
appeals. The process of filing, auditing, and settling cost reports is a lengthy
one, usually lasting more than a year.' 4' For example, in Doctors General Hospital,
139. In more technical statutory terminology, it has defined the phrase "such reports . . . as
the secretary may require in order to make payment" to mean cost reports and it has defined
"final determination of the Secretary as to the amount of the payment under PPS" to mean the
notice of program reimbursement. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a) (Supp. III 1985).

140. See supra text accompanying note 20.
141.

Hospitals have three months (with a possible one month extension) to file cost reports,

and intermediaries have twelve months to conduct an audit and issue a notice of program reimbursement. 42 C.F.R. SS 405.453(0, .1835(c) (1985). In Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Heckler, 4
MEDICARE & MEDIcAID GUIDE (CCH)
34,832, at 9173 n.3 (D.S.C. July 19, 1985), the court
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Inc. v. Heckler,'42 the plaintiff hospital had not yet received its reimbursement
notice for fiscal year 1982 when the court decided the case in 1985.141 Requiring
hospitals to wait this long before appealing PPS issues serves no purpose other
than consolidating the two appeals. Settlement of the cost report has no bearing
on PPS payments. Under cost-based reimbursement, hospitals must undergo a
complex cost accounting and allocation process each year to determine what
share of the hospital's costs should be borne by Medicare. 44 The costs of
inpatient services and of hospital administration are allocated according to the
ratio of Medicare patient days to total patient days. The costs in each ancillary
department (surgery, radiology, laboratory, etc.) are allocated according to the
ratio in each department of charges for Medicare services to total patient
charges.' 4 There are detailed rules for determining whether particular costs may
be included in the allocated pool of costs. 4"' These complex allocation rules do

not apply to prospective payment since payment is based on set rates determined
solely by a patient's illness, condition, and age. Therefore, nothing in the cost
47
report settlement process aids PPS review.'
Congress recognized this fact when it amended the appeal statute to allow
the creation of a new appeal mechanism. Congress contemplated two separate
appeals by hospitals reimbursed under both PPS and the cost-based system.
Therefore, HCFA's rejection of the opportunity to fashion a new appeal mechanism and' its requirement of a reimbursement notice for a PPS appeal has
little support in logic or in purpose.
In contrast with the "foolish consistency" discussed in section II of denying
retroactive relief because of the prospective nature of the payment system, here
HCFA pursues a foolish inconsistency. Where the timing aspect of payment
under the new system is at issue, HCFA has been unfaithful to the concept
of prospectivity. Courts have recognized this failure in administration and have
accepted the providers' position, while rejecting HCFA's position. 4 For example, in both Washington Hospital System v. Bowen and St. Francis Hospital v.

stated that the hospitals did not expect to receive their reimbursement notice from their first PPS
year until twenty months after the end of the fiscal year.
142. 613 F. Supp. 1036 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
143. Id. at 1040.

144. This is a complex calculation because so many hospital costs, such as nursing salaries,
equipment costs, plant costs, and general administration expenses, are indirect or overhead. M.
FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 206, table 10-8 (1979). Physician charges are not part of
hospital costs but are billed separately and reimbursed under Part B of Medicare. 42 U.S.C. S
1395k (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
145. See 42 C.F.R. SS 405.402-.403 (1985).
146. See id. SS 405.414-.436.

147. The opinion in Charter Medical Corp. v. Bowen seems to reason to the contrary: "These
reports include the number of medicare patients discharged by the hospital during that year. This
number is multiplied by the already-fixed prospective payment rates to determine part of the
hospital's reimbursement." 788 F.2d 728, 731 (11th Cir. 1986). Although this information may
be contained in the cost report, it is merely a duplicative summary of payment activity already
completed. The suggestion that hospitals are not paid PPS amounts until the cost report is submitted

is wrong. See discussion of the PPS payment process infra, text accompanying notes 154-56.
148.

See cases cited supra notes 118-19.
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Bowen, the courts struck down HCFA's rule, in part because it was contrary
4
to the spirit of prospectivity.' "

D.

The Hospitals' Position

Rejection of HCFA's position does not in itself validate the providers' argument, however. An independent examination of the reasonableness of the
providers' suggestion of an immediate, beginning-of-the-year appeal is necessary.
As shown, this option is no more mandated by the statute than is HCFA's rule.
The question is whether, given the nature of PPS, the providers' appeal structure is the best structure that could be created under the statute.
The hospitals' position appears compelling at first glance. Once a hospital's
PPS rate is set at the beginning of the year, all factors have been decided that
will determine the hospital's payment for the ensuing year except the medical
necessity of treatment and the proper DRG assignment for each patient." These
latter issues are not subject to Review Board jurisdiction."' Because the Review
Board has jurisdiction only over the rate, there is no reason to wait beyond
2
the initial setting of the rate to bring a PPS appeal. 15
Explained in full, PPS works as follows: HCFA sets and periodically revises
DRG categories, which determine the weight given to each discharge. This
process is not subject to any review.' 5 Then, by September 1, one month

149. 795 F.2d at 148; 802 F.2d at 700.
150. See Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Heckler, 4

MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
34,832,
at 9174 (D.S.C. July 19, 1985) ("IT]he amount of the payment for each discharge is determined

before the year begins. The only additional information that is known at the end of the year is
how many discharges the hospital made and to which DRG each discharge was assigned during
the year.").

151. See 42 U.S.C. SS 1320c-3(aX2), 1395oo(g) (1982). In fact, they are conclusively determined
by a separate review process conducted by entities known as Peer Review Organizations, which
review medical records in individual cases. See id. SS 1320c-3(a)(I), 1395cc(aXl)(F).
152. HCFA might argue that the three-month time delay in Peer Review Organization (PRO)
review of PPS bills already paid requires a year-end settling process in order to recoup payments
that the PRO later determines were improperly made. This is not sufficient justification for awaiting
a reimbursement notice. Under the cost-based reimbursement appeal system, there was no structural
coordination between the review of individual payment disputes and the cost report appeal process.
Therefore, there is even less need for such coordination under PPS because under the cost system
an individual claim denial affected the entire complex calculation of the total amount of annual
reimbursement, whereas under PPS an individual claim denial affects payment for only that patient.
Under the cost system, it was not unusual for some individual patient bills to be resolved only
after the cost report had been settled. In such cases, usually the amount of reimbursement affected
was simply recouped against future payments or was paid the next year. Reopening the settled
cost report was required for large amounts. Telephone conversation with Susan Nash, Director of
Medicare Department for Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Arizona (Dec. 18, 1985); see 42 C.F.R. S
405.370 (1985) (recouping overpayments); id. S 405.1885 (reopening intermediary determinations).
This procedure is even more workable under PPS because there is no concern with reopening a
cost report. If a PRO denies a PPS bill already paid, all the intermediary needs to do is to recoup
this payment from a future payment due the provider. Id. S 405.370. If a provider reverses a
PRO denial, then the intermediary need only make an additional payment. A year-end settlement
is not required.

153.

42 U.S.C.

S 1395ww(d)(7) (Supp. III 1985).
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before the beginning of each HCFA fiscal year, HCFA publishes new national
(or regional) average standardized amounts per discharge. During the transition
period, HCFA also notifies hospitals of their hospital-specific rates before the
start of their first PPS fiscal year. 5 4 When a hospital discharges its first patient,
it sends a bill to its fiscal intermediary. The intermediary pays an amount
determined by the product of the DRG weight for that patient and the hospital's
PPS rate. The payment constitutes final payment for each discharge claimed. '
This process is repeated for each patient during the year. Any dispute as to
the proper DRG assignment for a particular patient or whether the patient's
treatment is covered by Medicare is resolved through other, non-Review-Board
mechanisms. Thus, the only PPS issues subject to Review Board appeal are
those affecting the initial rate. Waiting until the end of the year to appeal the
rate serves no purpose because, unlike cost-based reimbursement, the prospective
5
payment system "requires no year end retrospective adjustment."'1
One important qualification must be noted. In order to ease cash flow
problems, some hospitals are not paid on a per discharge basis. Instead, they
are paid under a "periodic interim payment" system. This system levels out
the amount the hospital is paid over the year, based on an estimate of the
average reimbursement expected every two weeks. 157 For these hospitals, a yearend settlement is necessary before the amount of payment is finally determined,
even under PPS. '"1 As explained in HCFA's instruction manual to intermediaries, periodic payments "are subject to final settlement at year end based
on a reconciliation to total payments as determined on a per discharge basis.'""
Thus, for hospitals receiving leveled periodic payments, there may be reason
to wait until the year end before allowing a PPS appeal. Then, all issues relating
'
to PPS payments would be considered at once by the Review Board. "'
Even for hospitals paid on a per discharge basis, beginning-of-the-year rate
154.

Medical Center Hosp. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE

& MEDICAID GUIDE

(CCH)

9522 (M.D. Fla. July 19, 1985).
155. 49 Fed. Reg. 234, 269 (1984), reprinted in 2 MEDICARE & MEDICAID
7253.40.
156. HCFA MANUAL, supra note 75, S 2405.1, reprinted in 2 MEDICARE &

GUIDE

34,920, at

(CCH)

MEDICAID

GUIDE

(CCH) 7253A.
157. 42 C.F.R. S 405.4540) (1985).
158. Note, though, that the number of hospitals eligible for periodic payments under PPS has

been curtailed by a recent statutory change that restricts the periodic payment method for PPS
hospitals beginning on July 1, 1987. Thereafter, only small rural hospitals and hospitals serving
a disproportionate share of Medicare and Medicaid patients will be eligible for such payments.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, S 9311 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
SS 1395g, 1395h(c) & 1395(4)(c)).
159. HCFA MANUAL, supra note 75, § 2405.1, reprinted in 2 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE
(CCH) 7253A.
160. Hospitals might object that the arithmetical adjustment for periodic payments is so simple
that appeal issues will rarely arise, but Murphy's law is in full force under Medicare. For example,
disputes may arise concerning to which year to allocate a patient who is admitted in one year and
discharged in the next. On the other hand, since such disputed bills would eventually be paid in
one year for another, and since delaying appeals until the end of the year to encompass
periodic payment disputes would be for the hospitals' benefit, not HCFA's, it might be fair to
overlook this minor qualification. As the text develops more fully below, these judgments are for
HCFA, not the courts, to make in the first instance.
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appeals may prove administratively cumbersome because of the problems associated with establishing the $10,000 minimum jurisdictional amount in controversy. 6' The exact magnitude of the effect of an erroneous PPS rate depends
on factors not known at the start of the year, factors such as the number of
patients treated and the hospital's case mix. Where there is little dispute that
the amount will be more than $10,000, a reasonable estimate can be based on
past years' experience. 62 Where the issue is closer, however, it might be more
sensible to wait until the end of the year to appeal.
Nonetheless, waiting until the end of the year does not mean waiting until
after the cost report is settled. The adjustment for periodic payments requires
no audit and no cost report. It merely requires a comparison for the year of
the total amount of periodic payments received with the total amount payable
under bills submitted.' 63 Likewise, the magnitude of a PPS rate error can be
quickly and easily computed. Thus, an outline of one sensible appeal structure
is to allow PPS appeals each year once a hospital knows its rate, unless the
hospital has opted to receive periodic payments or unless there is a genuine
dispute over the jurisdictional amount. Then, the hospital may appeal after final
settlement of total PPS payments, which must occur shortly after it has submitted all bills for the year. If this dual system is too cumbersome, it might
be more sensible to require all hospitals to wait until shortly after the end of
the year for a final reconciliation of PPS payments.
E.

The Courts' Analyses

Courts are not in a position to legislate the most sensible appeal structure,
however. Rather, they may only determine whether HCFA's rule is invalid."' 4
161.

42 U.S.C. S 1395oo(aX2) (1982).

162.

Washington Hosp. Center v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 143 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
34,832,
at 9174 n.5 (D.S.C. July 19, 1985) ("[The year end] reconciliation [for periodic paymentsl is
merely an arithmetical adjustment and does not require the issuance of an NPR. In fact, the
hospitals assert that the settlement has already been made without waiting for an NPR.").
164. Three administrative law doctrines - all beyond the scope of this article - lend support
to the conclusion that HCFA's rule is invalid. First, under the arbitrary and capricious test, the
rule must be upheld, if at all, only on the basis of the reasons advanced by the agency. See SEC
v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). HCFA justifies its rule as the correct interpretation of the
statute. See, e.g., Washington Hosp. Center v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The
statute, however, imposes no such requirement. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38. This flaw
in the agency's reasoning is fatal even if the rule might be sustainable as an independent exercise
of the agency's discretion because independent judgment is not the basis on which the agency
purported to act. See Chenery, 318 U.S. at 94.
Second, even as an exercise of the agency's independent judgment, the rule may not be sustainable. The arbitrary and capricious test is interpreted with varying degrees of scrutiny. Following
the Supreme Court's conflicting signals in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971) (arbitrary and capricious test is a "narrow" one, but also requires a
"thorough, probing, in-depth review"), the federal courts have differed in how strictly they apply
the "arbitrary and capricious" test. See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO, & P. VERWL, ADMiNt5srATIVE
LAW AND PRocEss 377-409 (1985). Although HCFA has not crafted the soundest appeal structure,
its system might be considered sufficiently rational to survive lax scrutiny. It would, however, have
difficulty under stricter scrutiny.

163. See Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Heckler, 4
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If they so determine, then the question becomes how to proceed when faced
with a statute that confers a right to an appeal but is too indeterminate to be
self-executing. A court might require HCFA to redraft its rule, or it might
decide that hospitals may bring PPS appeals in any reasonable fashion within
the allowable bounds of the statute.'65 This is not how the courts have reasoned
in considering these issues, however.
1.

Excessive Certainty

Courts considering PPS appeals have incorrectly analyzed the cases because
they have not properly framed the issue. Instead of asking whether HCFA's
or the providers' positions are within the possible range of reasonable appeal
mechanisms, the courts have asked whether HCFA's rule or the provider's
position is the correct interpretation of the statute. They have thus incorrectly
assumed, either implicitly or explicitly, that the statute prescribes a particular
appeal procedure. As Professor Rand Rosenblatt observes, "[a] court [should]
recognize[ ] that broadly worded statutes permit an agency to reach more than
one permissible policy outcome and that a court should not substitute its judgment for that of the agency by dictating what that outcome should be.'"",' This
Third, the HCFA rule may be outside the bounds of the agency's statutory authority, and

therefore, contrary to law. Given the bipartite structure of 42 U.S.C. S 1395oo(a)(l)(A) (Supp.
III 1985) (jurisdiction of Review Board), a court might reason that, while Congress left the precise
appeal structure to HCFA's determination, it at least required separate appeal mutes for cost-based
reimbursement and for PPS. See supra text accompanying note 138; cf. Washington Hosp. Center
v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 144-45 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (concluding that Congress contemplated two
different kinds of appeal). Courts, however, can be unpredictable. Despite the command that courts
determine questions of law de novo - including statutory construction, see 5 U.S.C. S 706 (1982)
- courts frequently defer to agency constructions of their governing statutes. See R. PIERCE, S.
SHAPIRO, & P. VERKUIL, supra, at 372-77. Although the multiple factors that inform judicial decisions
in this area offer some guide, the choice between de novo review and deference is largely indeterminate.
165. A third possibility is suggested by the language of the statute allowing an appeal if the
hospital does not receive a "final determination" on a timely basis. 42 U.S.C. $ 1395oo(aXl)(B)(C) (1982). A hospital could contend that requiring it to wait for a reimbursement notice is an
undue delay in issuing a final determination of PPS issues, thereby prompting this statutory right
to an early appeal. This is not a satisfactory argument because Congress, for no apparent reason,
failed to amend this portion of the statute to accommodate PPS appeals. The statute refers to
delays only in receiving final determinations from intermediaries regarding cost reports; it does not
mention delays in final determinations by the Secretary regarding prospective payments. Id. Although this may have been an oversight (like the oversight concerning the Board's decisionmaking
authority discussed supra notes 136-38), it is difficult to see any way of remedying the oversight
without Congressional revision.
166. Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural Approach, 88 YALE LJ.
243, 257 (1978). District courts are not the only tribunals that tend toward excessive certainty in
their review of agency action. Judge Winter has made the same point with respect to the Supreme

Court's review of NLRB decisions:
If the Board is affirmed by an opinion that approves the decision below as being the
only one possible, rather than as a correct one within the realm of agency discretion, a
future Board will be precluded from changing the rule . . . . The Board's ability to
experiment and to be politically responsive has thus been unduly narrowed.
Winter, Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the Court, 1968 Sup. CT.

REv. 53, 74-75.
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failure to recognize the statute's generality ' 67 has led to confusion and imprecise
analysis. " ," More troubling is that providers who have relied on the regulations
and who have waited for their reimbursement notices to appeal first-year PPS
rates may now be foreclosed by decisions that hold that PPS appeals must be
commenced within 180 days of the beginning of the year. Three influential
decisions illustrate the error in the implicit assumption that the statute provides
an answer.
In Redbud Hospital District v. Heckler, '69 the first decision to adopt the hospitals'
position and allow an early PPS appeal, a California federal district court rejected HCFA's requirement of cost report settlement. The court relied on regulations that declare as "final" HCFA's notice of a hospital's transition year
PPS rate. 7 " The court observed an inconsistency in attempting "to provide
that this [rate] determination . . .is final [yet] does not fall within the category
of final determinations reviewable by the Board."'' Framing the issue in terms
of the finality of the rate incorrectly requires an answer in favor of the providers
because it assumes that the appealable event is the issuance of a "rate." Instead,
the statute refers to a final determination of the amount of "payment." Having
previously wrestled with whether "payment" means "rate" and what "rate"
really means, the only conclusion is that no definition can be derived with any
certainty from the statute.
The most serious defect in these decisions is not the reason for invalidating
HCFA's rule that delays PPS appeals until long after the end of the year. Rather,
it is the failure to explain why no end-of-the-year notice is required. Exemplary
of this failure is the court's decision in Greenville Hospital System v. Heckler,' 2
which concluded:
The [reimbursement notice] requirement for PPS appeals is inconsistent
with the plain language added to [the appeal statute] as part of the PPS
amendment. The amendment provides that determinations as to the
hospital-specific portion of the prospective payment can be appealed before [a reimbursement notice] is issued.' z
But when before a reimbursement notice is issued? If the cost report is not the
"report required in order to make payment under [PPS]" and the notice is
not "a final determination as to the amount of the payment under [PPS],"
then what are? The statute does not answer these questions. Although HCFA

167.

For example, the D.C. Circuit was impressed by the "specificity of the statutory language

at issue." Washington Hosp. Center v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 147 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
168. Blame for these faults does not lie solely with the courts; courts generally address the
issues in the terms presented by the parties. The fault should be shared with the litigants, who
tend to present their claims in an exaggerated manner, or with the adversary process itself, which
encourages such exaggeration of position.
169. [1984-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 34,085 (N.D. Cal. July
30, 1984), applicationfor stay of injunction granted in part and denied in part, 106 S. Ct. 1 (1985).
170. 42 C.F.R. S 412.71(d) (1985).
171. Redbud, [1984-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE at 9880.
172. 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
34,832 (D.S.C. July 17, 1985).
173. Id. at 9175.
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may have been wrong in its initial rule, courts should not inadvertently deny
HCFA an opportunity to revise the appeal procedures in a more reasonable
fashion. But this is the effect of the courts' decisions when they hold that the
statute gives hospitals a right to an immediate appeal.
While the Greenville decision comes close to understanding why courts should
not foreclose HCFA's flexibility, it falls short. The court correctly explained
that, given the manner in which PPS works, "the amount of the payment for
each discharge is determined before the year begins . . . [a]nd [usually] nothing

that happens at the end of the year changes the amount the hospital is paid
for each discharge. 1 1 74 Next, the court correctly noted the exception for hospitals
receiving periodic payments, but then it lost sight of the mark: "reconciliation
[of periodic payments] is merely an arithmetical adjustment and does not require
the issuance of a [reimbursement notice]. '" 7" This is true, but the adjustment
requires the issuance of some determination, which the providers' appeal system
does not accommodate. While HCFA's system may go far beyond what is
necessary to accommodate the periodic payment adjustment, the providers' system ignores the adjustment. What is required is a more sensitive refitting of
the appeal procedures to the nuances of PPS, a task the courts should not
undertake.
The most thorough analysis to date occurs in Washington Hospital Center v.
Bowen. 176 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals correctly developed at length the
reasons why HCFA is wrong in contending that the statute requires waiting
for an audited cost report. 77 However, the court was too eager to finish the
job. It found that the statute's "plain language" mandates an appeal as soon
as the hospital is notified of its PPS rate. 78 Ignoring the imprecision of the
statutory language, the court fell into the deceptively attractive trap of believing
that the statute precisely defines "amount of payment."' 19 The statute proved
1
too "linguistically complicated" and too full of "semantic twists and turns"' '4
for the court to perceive that the apparent definitional route leads to an absurd
result. Critically, the court failed to realize the central role in the payment
process of the assignment of individual patients to particular DRGs. It also
mistakenly believed that advance knowledge of payment rates is an essential
aspect of the prospective payment system.'

174. Id. at 9174.
175. Id. at 9174 n.5.
176. 795 F.2d 139 (D.C. 1986); see also St. Francis Hosp. v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 697 (4th Cir.
1986) (largely following the D.C. Circuit analysis).
177. Washington Hosp. Center, 795 F.2d at 144-46.
178. Id. at 144, 147-48.
179. Id. at 146-47.
180. Id. at 147-48.
181. Id. at 148. The court's emphasis on advance knowledge is critical in several respects.
The court unwittingly gave strong but erroneous support to HCFA's prospective relief rule. This
was thus a dangerous victory for the hospitals. The court's superficial treatment of the essence of
prospectivity illustrates the pervasive importance of this apparently purely theoretical point in crafting
a precisely-tailored appeal system. The Fourth Circuit displayed a more sensitive treatment of this
issue in St. Francis Hosp. v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 1986). It discussed the relevance
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Thus, the flaw in these otherwise well-reasoned rejections of HOFA's timing
rule is that each court sets out to resolve an unanswerable question, namely,
what appeal system does the statute require. It requires none; instead it allows
one to be crafted. There are important ramifications of the flaws noted in these
court decisions. As already shown, the courts preclude HOFA from redrafting
the PPS appeal rules in any manner other than that advocated by the providers.
An alternative appeal structure, however, may be necessary to accommodate
administrative considerations such as the operation of the periodic payment
process or the need to establish the minimum jurisdictional amount. Moreover,
the decisions may have an unintended effect on hospitals that chose not to
challenge HOFA's appeal rules. More than 180 days have passed since hospitals
that waited for their reimbursement notices received notice of their PPS rates.
Because courts reason that the statute requires an immediate appeal after notice
of the PPS rate, these complacent providers may be jurisdictionally foreclosed
2
from challenging first-year PPS rates.'
Moreover, hospitals that advocate an early appeal should be aware that they
are fighting with a two-edged sword. If courts agree that the statute requires
an immediate appeal, then hospitals may be restricted to only one PPS appeal
each year at the beginning of the year. They may be foreclosed from appealing
later intermediary actions affecting their PPS payments. It is a foolish hospital
that is comfortable with the thought that once the correct PPS rate is set, it
will need no further recourse against the government.' 3
2.

Confusion Between Agency and Judicial Jurisdiction

Some recent court decisions are analytically confused in other respects. First,
some courts have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of judicial jurisdiction
over PPS appeals by confusing the issue of Review Board jurisdiction with the
question of their own jurisdiction. Federal courts have jurisdiction over any
decision of the Review Board. Some courts incorrectly believe that a Review
Board decision denying jurisdiction over a premature PPS appeal confers judicial
jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case.'8 4 This is a misguided view. A
of advance knowledge of rates under PPS without declaring this facet of the system to be its
.,essence."
182. This foreclosure is presented as a risk rather than as a certainty because courts may be
willing to extend the appeal period using equitable tolling doctrine or may otherwise excuse the
failure to appeal a't the beginning of the year because of the lack of clarity in the statute and
justifiable reliance on HCFA's rules. HOFA may not be so strident as to raise this objection, which
would deny hospitals the benefit of the very rules HCFA advocates. If the courts' decisions prevailed,
HCFA may allow hospitals that relied on its rules to appeal following issuance of the reimbursement
notice. Letter from Irwin Cohen, former attorney advisor to the Administrator of HOFA (Mar.

25, 1986).
183. For example, Congress recently enacted a requirement that intermediaries pay 95% of
"dean" PPS bills within 30 days (26 days beginning in the 1988 fiscal year). Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, P.L. 99-509, 5 9311(b) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 1395h(c)(2)).
If providers are successful in mandating a beginning-of-the-year appeal, they might lose any chance
to enforce this provision by, for example, collecting interest for late payments.
184. See St. Francis Hosp. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GuiD (CCH) 34,918, at
9513 (S.D. W. Va. Sept, 30, 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub noa. St. Francis Hosp. v. Bowen,
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Review Board decision denying jurisdiction gives the district court jurisdiction
to consider that decision, i.e., the question of the Board's jurisdiction." ' The
district court does not obtain jurisdiction over the merits.'i"
Although this point might seem obvious, it becomes more subtle when considering the following analytical trap. In Mathews v. Eldridge," 7 the United States
Supreme Court held that there are occasions when social security beneficiaries
(including Medicare recipients) may appeal a denial of benefits without exhausting their administrative remedies. The Court explained that there are two
exhaustion requirements. First, the claimant must present his claim for benefits
to the agency. Second, the claimant must fully exhaust all avenues of administrative review over the claim's initial decision." ' The second requirement may
be waived and judicial review accelerated if the agency affirmatively waives full
exhaustion, if exhaustion would be futile, or if exhaustion would cause irreparable injury.8 91
Several courts have used this waiver of exhaustion analysis by analogy"' in
the context of PPS appeals. They reason that the exhaustion requirement of a
reimbursement notice should be waived and judicial review obtained immediately if waiting for a Review Board hearing would be futile or would cause
irreparable injury.'91
This reasoning is troubling because reimbursement notices trigger Review
Board jurisdiction, not court jurisdiction. The administrative exhaustion relevant

802 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1986); Redbud Hosp. Dist. v. Heckler, [1984-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE
& MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
34,085, at 9879 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 1984), application for stay of
injunction granted in part and denied in part, 106 S. Ct. 1 (1985).
185. Tucson Medical Center v. Heckler, 611 F. Supp. 823, 825 (D.D.C. 1985); McKeesport
Hosp. v. Heckler, 612 F. Supp. 279, 282 (W.D. Pa. 1985).

186. The courts may have been led into this confusion of analysis by HCFA's extreme argument that the courts do not have any jurisdiction over any PPS question until a reimbursement
notice is issued, even the question of whether a notice should be required for Review Board
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Redbud Hosp. Dist. v. Heckler, [1984-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
34,085, at 9879-80 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 1984), applicationfor stay of injunction
granted in
187.
188.
189.

part and denied in part, 106 S. Ct. 1 (1985).
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 329.
Id. at 330-31.

190. Eldridge applies only by analogy because the statutory language it analyzed, 42 U.S.C.
S 40 5 (g) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (current version at 42 U.S.C. SS 405(b), (g) (1982)), applies
only to beneficiary appeals of individual payment denials, not to provider appeals of fiscal year
reimbursement issues. 42 U.S.C. S 1395ff(b) (Supp. III 1985). At least one court has failed to
recognize this distinction. See Healthcare Int'l, Inc. v. Memphis Hosp. Servs. Ass'n, [1984-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 34,214, at 10,409 (W.D. Tenn. 1984). Nevertheless, the analogy to Eldridge is a fair one. Since Eldridge interpreted the phrase "final decision
of the Secretary" in 4 05(g), surely it is relevant to the same phrase in the statute relating to PPS
rate appeals, 42 U.S.C. S 1395oo(a)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. III 1985).
191. Redbud Hosp. Dist. v. Heckler, [1984-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE
(CCH)
34,085, at 9880-81 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 1984), application for stay of injunction granted in

part and denied in part, 106 S. Ct. 1 (1985); Healthcare Int'l, Inc. v. Memphis Hosp. Servs. Ass'n,
[1984-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 34,214, at 10,409 (W.D. Tenn. Sept.
27, 1984).
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to court jurisdiction is Review Board review, not review by the intermediary.'
Thus, a provider who has not met the requirements for presenting a claim to
the Review Board, i.e., a settled cost report, has not met the mandatory,
nonwaivable Eldridge requirement. If a provider had a settled cost report, then
Eldridge might be relevant to whether it would be futile to go through all the
stages of Review Board review before appealing to court.' 93 Using Eldridge to
waive the reimbursement notice requirement, however, would be using it to
9 4
waive the nonwaivable element of exhaustion required for judicial jurisdiction.
If Eldridge applies to the requirement of a reimbursement notice, it is relevant
only with respect to the Review Board's jurisdiction, not the court's. 9 5 The issue
is whether a provider must meet the exhaustion prerequisites to Board review,
namely, awaiting a settled cost report. Recognizing that Eldridge operates only
at this secondary level within the review process is important for two reasons.
First, in this setting the Eldridge analogy is much more attenuated.""', Second,
if Eldridge does apply, it results only in a Review Board hearing, which may
take up to four years to complete. It does not result in an immediate court
appeal." Therefore, it is difficult to invoke the hardship prong of Eldridge
because an immediate Review Board appeal does not entirely avoid the claimed
hardship of awaiting full agency exhaustion. ""' For these reasons, the Eldridge

192. See McKeesport Hosp. v. Heckler, 612 F. Supp. 279, 282 (W.D. Pa. 1985) ("We thus
follow a simple formula in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction . . . : we first determine
whether the [Board] has made a final decision. If not, we have no jurisdiction.").
193. This point is moot because the statute has been amended to allow expedited appeal to
the courts when the Board has no authority to determine an issue of the validity of governing
regulations. 42 U.S.C. S 1395oo() (Supp. 111 1985).
194. Alternatively, Eldridge would be relevant if the courts had jurisdiction to review final
decisions of the Secretary concerning provider reimbursement and the Board were merely another
layer of agency review created by the Secretary before a decision is final. But the courts' jurisdiction
is to review final decisions of the Board (or reversals thereof by HOFA), and the Board is a
statutorily created and required level of review that has independent jurisdictional significance. See
id. § 1395oo (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
195. See St. Francis Hosp. v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 697, 701 (4th Cir. 1986).
196. It is one thing for courts to hold that an agency head has abused his discretion in
determining whether a precondition to the court's jurisdiction exists, as occurred in Eldridge. It is
quite another for courts to order a subordinate within an agency (the Board) to ignore the agency
head's directive of when the subordinate may entertain an administrative appeal, which is the case
here.
197. A double Eldridge analysis is arguably possible: the first to avoid the necessity for Review
Board jurisdiction of a "final determination by the Secretary as to the amount of payment under
[PPS]" (i.e., a reimbursement notice), and the second to avoid the requirement for court jurisdiction
of a final decision by the Board. This surely is carrying things too far.
198. Moreover, the nature of the futility or hardship claimed by hospitals must be critically
considered. In cases where they challenge the accuracy of their hospital-specific rate, hospitals may
argue that waiting for a reimbursement notice at the end of their first PPS year would be futile
because HOFA has refused to give retroactive effect to corrections in the base year costs. This is
legitimate if the providers concede (or at least do not question) the validity of the prospective relief
rule. But if they challenge this rule at the same time, then it is circular to place futility on this
basis, as one court has done. See St. Francis Hosp. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE
St. Francis Hosp.
(CCH) 34,918 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 30, 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nora.
v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1986). The court obtained jurisdiction because of the futility
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analysis is not the solution to avoiding HCFA's requirement of a reimbursement
notice. 199 The validity of this requirement must be faced head on.
3.

Undue Attention to the Prospective Relief Rule

In most PPS appeals, the frustrating aspect of awaiting settlement of the
cost report has been that HOFA refuses to adjust retroactively the hospitalspecific rate when the provider prevails. 200 The combined effect of this "prospective relief rule" discussed in section II and the reimbursement notice requirement produces a paradox: HOFA will not correct the hospital-specific rate
unless errors are established prior to the beginning a PPS year, but appeals with
respect to this rate may not be brought until long after the end of a PPS year.
The obvious unfairness of this conflicting position has motivated courts to strike
2
down the requirement of a reimbursement notice. 01
The more direct and effective remedy for this unfairness, however, is to
strike the prospective relief rule itself. Absent a rule barring retroactive relief,
usually no irreparable injury is caused by waiting to pursue a PPS appeal
because the statute provides for payment of interest during the delay.2"2 Invalidating the rule that bars retroactive relief will alleviate many of the courts'
and the hospitals' concerns that have arisen in the early appeal cases."' With
created by the very rule it struck down in the case. If the prospective relief rule is in fact invalid,
then full relief may be obtained in a subsequent suit.
199. This result may be harsh; however, jurisdiction may exist on other bases that are simpler
and more direct. If a Review Board appeal will be futile because the provider will suffer irreparable
harm or cease to exist by going out of business, then a court has authority in certain circumstances
under the All Writs Act to issue an injunction protecting its future jurisdiction. See V.N.A. of
Greater Tift County, Inc. v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 1020 (11th Cir. 1983); Redbud Hosp. Dist. v.
Heckler, [1984-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE 34,085, at 9881-82 (N.D. Cal.
July 30, 1984), application for stay of injunction granted in part and denied in part, 106 S. Ct. 1 (1985).
If the delay will moot the case or foreclose effective relief, then mandamus is available in proper
circumstances. See Ellis v. Blum, 643 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1981); White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Califano v. White, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). These mechanisms
can handle truly extraordinary circumstances without opening jursidictional doors so wide that
statutory restrictions no longer have any meaning.
A good example is presented in Redbud Hospital, which involved a very small, rural hospital.
When Redbud Hospital entered the prospective payment system, it was immediately threatened
with bankruptcy because HCFA had failed to account in its hospital-specific rate for the dramatic
increase in the hospital's operating costs caused by an addition in 1983 of an intensive care unit.
HCFA took the position that the increased costs could not be included in the PPS rate because
they did not exist in 1982, the base year. If Redbud Hospital had been required to wait until
long after the end of its first PPS year to appeal, it would have been driven out of business. The
court cited this as grounds for allowing an early appeal under the mandamus statute.
200. See supra notes 25 & 34 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Doctor's Gen. Hosp. Inc. v. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 1036, 1040 (S.D. Fla. 1985)
("patently unfair"); Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Heckler, 4 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
34,832, at 9175 (D.S.C. July 19, 1985) ("operates to deprive providers of the right to a meaningful
appeal granted by Congress").
202. 42 U.S.C. S 1395g(d) (1982). The exceptional case presented by a hospital like Redbud
that is threatened by bankruptcy during the delay can be dealt with through the All Writs Act or
mandamus. See supra note 199.
203. This is well illustrated by the petition for rehearing in Charter Medical Corp. v. Bowen,
788 F.2d 728 (11th Cir. 1986). This case involved a challenge to the reimbursement notice re-
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the prospective relief rule set aside, courts will not be tempted to impose an
unduly lenient appeal structure for the life of the prospective payment system
based on concerns that exist only during the four-year transition period.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A glaring inconsistency exists in the two major rules affecting how rate
appeals are pursued under the prospective payment system. Under the first
rule, HCFA insists on pure prospectivity by refusing retroactive correction of
PPS rates. Under the second rule, HCFA abandons its fidelity to prospectivity
by refusing to allow rate appeals at the beginning of the year. An exploration
of this inconsistency leads to an inquiry of how the concept of prospectivity
operates under the new payment system. The answer to this inquiry, far from
resolving the inconsistency, shows its sharply ironic nature.
The heart of the prospective system is the removal of hospitals' control over
the amount of reimbursement they receive for each patient. Just as a competitive
market forces firms to accept payment determined by factors beyond their control, prospective payments force hospitals to accept payments set by objective
standards rather than by their particular costs. The sense of prospectivity that
requires absolute certainty of the amount of hospitals' externally determined
payment rates adds no incentive for efficient behavior, the overriding goal of
PPS. This second sense of prospectivity has some importance, however. If rates
are set in advance, budgets are easier to project and individual patient bills
may be paid as the patients are discharged. But this administrative concern is
secondary to the more important, substantive aspect of prospectivity.
Once the crucial feature of the prospective payment system is recognized,
the irony of HCFA's rules becomes apparent. In its prospective relief rule,
HCFA sacrifices substantive rate correction in order to preserve the less important procedural aspect of prospectivity. But where no sacrifice is involved
and only the timing of rate appeals is in issue, HCFA ignores prospectivity by
maintaining a retrospective rule that requires appeals to be initiated long after
the end of each PPS year. To use Emerson's image, HCFA is possessed with
the hobgoblins of both a foolish consistency and a foolish inconsistency.
quirement. Although the hospitals nominally lost the case, it was the government that petitioned
for rehearing. The hospitals were content with their loss because, in attempting to avoid the obvious
unfairness of the coupling of this appeal rule with the prospective relief rule, the government
appeared to concede that the hospitals would be eligible for full retroactive relief. 788 F.2d at 73435. With such relief available, the hospitals were not as concerned about the delay in their PPS
appeals.
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